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I. INTRODUCTION
Disability discrimination permeates the American health insur-
ance system.  Insurers may harm people with disabilities through
their benefits designs, by limiting covered inpatient hospital days, by
only covering rehabilitative services that achieve full and not partial
recovery, or by excluding from coverage disability-critical services like
habilitative care or durable wheelchairs.  Some discrimination may be
unintentional, but nonetheless harmful, for example if insurers design
their health benefits with only the nondisabled in mind.  Some dis-
crimination may be purposeful as private insurers have incentives to
discriminate against the disabled because of their collectively high
health care consumption.1
Disability-based discrimination by health insurers is problematic
for the same reasons that disability discrimination is problematic in
other contexts.  Adequate health benefits at affordable rates are inte-
gral to a disabled person’s full participation in society.2  Unchecked
health insurance discrimination may undermine the admirable goals
1. For examples of how insurers may limit services to the disabled, particularly pri-
vate insurers, see Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insur-
ance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287, 308 (1993) (explaining how American
health care is distributed “in inverse relation to need, and to the large extent that
commercial insurers operate on this principle, the American reliance on the pri-
vate sector as its main provider of health insurance establishes a system that is
perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick people away from doctors”); see
Mary Crossley, Becoming Visible: The ADA’s Impact on Health Care for Persons
with Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 51, 78 (2000) (explaining how private insurers
“have traditionally made it their business on a routine basis to make decisions
regarding the availability and nature of benefits by taking into account individu-
als’ health characteristics in a fashion that could often be construed as discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of
Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 27 (2004) (explaining the impact of preexisting
condition exclusions on people with disabilities and the adequacy of their health
care coverage); see also Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidis-
crimination Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1159, 1166 (explaining how insurers engage “in risk-assessment and
other profit-maximizing strategies that systematically disadvantage people with
histories of illness and chronic health conditions”).
2. Disability and Health, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHYPEOPLE
.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/disability-and-
health [https://perma.unl.edu/3W3V-LXRJ]. See also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2007) (ad-
vocating for equality for the disabled for political and moral reasons).
2017] RESTORING CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE DISABLED 1073
of the disability rights movement to equalize participation by the dis-
abled in civic and social life.3  Civil rights laws for the disabled, like
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4 and its predecessor, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act),5 have done much to improve
the lives of disabled Americans in the workplace and in public life.
Despite these broad advancements for the disabled, the laws have
proven fruitless in combating health insurance discrimination.6
The ADA’s and Rehab Act’s failures in the context of health insur-
ance can be attributed to a thirty-year-long unwillingness by the
courts to consider health insurance benefits as within the scope of civil
rights protections for the disabled.  Beginning with the Supreme
Court in Alexander v. Choate, courts have applied a “meaningful ac-
cess” standard, holding that benefits providers need only offer people
with disabilities access to their programs, but need not ensure that
the programs offer the disabled comparable benefits.7  In other words,
antidiscrimination laws only provide people with disabilities with the
ability to access a program, not the right to challenge its content.  Any
effort to argue for better or different benefits is viewed as a “funda-
mental alteration” to a program which is an affirmative defense for
insurers.8  Professor Samuel Bagenstos aptly dubbed this judicial rea-
soning framework the “access/content” distinction.9  For example, a
civil rights claim that a disabled person was barred from buying the
same health insurance plan as others might succeed.  But a claim that
the benefits themselves are discriminatory in some way would not.
Given this access/content distinction, insurers have an affirmative de-
fense against any benefit changes on the basis that it fundamentally
alters their programs.  They need not even prove that the benefit
change is too costly or burdensome, only that it involves a change to
3. NUSSBAUM, supra note 2, at 15.
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
6. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Civil Rights in a Changing Health Care System, 16
HEALTH AFF. 90, 91 (1997); David Barton Smith, Healthcare’s Hidden Civil
Rights Legacy, 48 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 37, 45–47 (2003) (discussing the limited his-
tory of civil rights in health care).
7. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985).
8. Both Titles II and III of the ADA only require covered entities to make reasonable
modifications to their programs.  Entities are not required to make “fundamental
alterations” to their programs.  Fundamental alterations are seen as changes to
the basic character of the good or service.  For more on this, see Sara Rosenbaum,
The Americans with Disabilities Act in a Health Care Context, in THE FUTURE OF
DISABILITY IN AMERICA (Marilyn J. Field & Alan M. Jette eds., 2007).  See also
infra Part III for a discussion of this topic in greater detail.
9. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 55, 71 (2009) (stating in health insurance cases, “accommodation can
be required only if it provides people with disabilities ‘access’ to the same benefit
received by nondisabled individuals; an accommodation that would alter the ‘con-
tent’ of the benefit will not be required”).
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benefits.10  Thus, even modest and uncostly requests for benefit
changes are beyond the reach of these laws.  For these reasons, disa-
bility rights protections are completely deficient at combating benefits
discrimination in health insurance.11
Importantly, the access/content distinction compromises the Rehab
Act’s and the ADA’s accommodation mandates which form the heart of
disability antidiscrimination law.12  The Rehab Act and the ADA col-
lectively recognize that reasonable accommodation in employment,
transportation, public infrastructure, and other settings is necessary
to fully and meaningfully integrate disabled people into society.13  Un-
like other antidiscrimination laws, the ADA and Rehab Act specifi-
cally recognize that treating the disabled the same as the nondisabled
is simply not enough.  Sometimes disabled people’s unique needs have
to be taken into account in order to fully integrate them into society.14
Reasonable accommodation in health insurance is obviously critical:
the disabled’s health care needs (and broader goals of social integra-
tion) will not be met if the insurers can design their benefits to take
into account only those with lesser health care needs.15  However, be-
10. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 71 (“[A]n accommodation that would alter the ‘con-
tent’ of the benefit will not be required even if it can be provided at reasonable
cost and without undue hardship.”).
11. Bagenstos, supra note 1 (“In short, the ADA has proven ineffective in challenging
the limits on private health insurance for people with disabilities, and the access/
content distinction has been largely responsible for that result.”); see also Alexan-
der Abbe, “Meaningful Access” To Health Care and the Remedies Available To
Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1161, 1202 (1999) (“Choate’s basic holding, that a blanket cap
on health care is not a deprivation of meaningful access, has been repeatedly
upheld by courts, but this holding overlooks the fact that treating the disabled
and nondisabled exactly alike will not result in the same benefits for the two
groups; otherwise, there would be no need for a Rehabilitation Act or an ADA.”).
12. Compare James Leonard, The Equity Trap: How Reliance on Traditional Civil
Rights Concepts Has Rendered Title I of the ADA Ineffective, 56 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2005) (“The ADA’s great innovation is the adoption of an active, inte-
grationist plan in a civil rights context . . . its principal tool is the reasonable
accommodation requirement.”), with Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation
as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 911
(2004) (describing commentators critique of reasonable accommodation as over-
stepping traditional civil rights doctrine).
13. Crossley, supra note 12; see also Leonard, supra note 12 (explaining that the
principle tool of the ADA is the reasonable accommodation provision).
14. Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 344 (2001) (“[T]he ADA requires different
treatment for people with disabilities.  The ADA gives recognition to the incontro-
vertible fact that to provide individuals with disabilities with equal opportunities
the civil rights model must be amended or expanded to incorporate the concept of
accommodations.”).
15. Sara Rosenbaum, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: An
Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options,
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cause of the access/content distinction, reasonable accommodation in
health insurance has been starkly absent.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) focused on
eradicating discrimination in health insurance particularly against
the unhealthy and these efforts can indirectly help the disabled who
collectively consume higher amounts of health care.  But, to the extent
that the ACA still allows for some disability-based discrimination (and
to the extent that measures against health status discrimination set
in motion by the ACA are repealed or no longer stand in the future),
civil rights attempts will prove important.  But such efforts are
doomed to failure so long as the access/content distinction stands.
This Article argues that the access/content divide is no longer good
law and courts should no longer use it to bar suits against insurers by
the disabled.  A variety of practical, legal, and regulatory changes to
our health care legal system have overturned the access/content di-
vide or, at the very least, have rendered it dangerously outdated.
Courts must consider a new approach to handling health insurance
discrimination against the disabled.
One reason to move past the access/content divide is the agency
that manages discrimination in health care, the Department of Health
and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (DHHS/OCR), has at-
tempted to look past this divide in its attending rules for section 1557,
the civil rights provision of the ACA, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, age, and disabilities by health care entities.16
This law suggests a new vision of equality in health benefits17 that
goes beyond the doctrine of Choate.  In reading section 1557 with
other provisions of the ACA, it is clear that DHHS/OCR and even Con-
gress have made health benefits fair game for civil rights and antidis-
crimination law, effectively overriding Choate.  Another reason is that,
in considering the rationales for the access/content distinction first ar-
ticulated by Choate, it’s very clear that they no longer hold weight in a
post-ACA health care world and may be bad precedent for courts to
uphold.
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II begins with a discussion
of the particular importance of health benefits for people with disabili-
ties.  It details why health insurance is so critical to the disabled as a
population, why the disabled tend to be discriminated against by in-
surers, what has been done about this so far through the ACA, and
where discrimination persists post-ACA.  Part III explains the Choate
Court’s reasoning in creating the access/content distinction and its im-
37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, no. 3, Fall 2009, at 114–15 (special supplement to issue
3).
16. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).
17. Valarie K. Blake, An Opening for Civil Rights in Health Insurance After the Af-
fordable Care Act, 36 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 235, 261 (2016).
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plications for disability civil rights claims in health insurance.  Part
IV argues that the access/content standard created by Choate should
be reconsidered in light of a new regulatory environment driven by
Congress through the ACA, and particularly by DHHS/OCR through
its section 1557 regulations.  Finally, Part V proposes that disability-
based health benefits discrimination challenges be considered by the
courts and by DHHS/OCR and that reasonable accommodation be the
standard for addressing inequities.  The Article ultimately challenges
the notion that health insurance benefits are immune from antidis-
crimination law and argues that it is legally and practically necessary
to reintroduce disability antidiscrimination law into health insurance.
II. THE DISABLED, HEALTH INSURANCE, AND
BENEFITS DISCRIMINATION
The disabled collectively have greater and sometimes unique
health care needs when compared to the nondisabled.  While this is
not true for all disabled people, many need health services in order to
fully integrate into society.
The Affordable Care Act has improved the climate of health care
financing for everyone, including the disabled, but some discrimina-
tion remains.  This section will highlight the importance of health care
benefits for the disabled and areas where discrimination in health in-
surance persists, informing why civil rights for the disabled are criti-
cal in the health insurance context.
A. The Relationship Between Medical Need and Disability
Before discussing the particular medical needs of the disabled, it is
important to define what it means to have a disability.  In 2010, 56.7
million Americans had a disability, making up almost 20% of our civil-
ian population.18  The term “disabled” can have varying social, medi-
cal, or political definitions.  For this paper, I adopt the standard legal
definition found in the ADA and the Rehab Act.  There, disability is
defined by having a physical or mental impairment that affects a ma-
jor life activity, such as walking, eating, drinking, or leaving the
home.19  Disabilities can be physical, mental, or both.20  While disabil-
18. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 25th Anniversary of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (May 28, 2015), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/facts-for-features/
2015/cb15-ff10.html [https://perma.unl.edu/P3TQ-Z6A9]
19. This also broadly captures people who are perceived by others as having such a
disability or who have a record or history of a disability.  Americans with Disabil-
ities Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
20. In a Kaiser Family Foundation survey of 1505 disabled adults aged 18–64, 61% of
disabled reported having a physical disability, 15% had a mental disability, and
24% had both. KRISTINA HANSON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UNDERSTANDING
THE HEALTHCARE NEEDS AND EXPERIENCES OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: FIND-
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ity can be congenital, for example being born blind, most disabilities
occur in adult years from accident or illness, for example an amputa-
tion that is a result of a car accident.21  We are all vulnerable to disa-
bility—one in four people are disabled by retirement age22 and two-
thirds of people are disabled by age 85.23
Not all disabled people have significant health care needs, nor can
all disabled be properly described as sick.  Take a person with a move-
ment disability, like quadriplegia, and ask yourself whether you
would view them as sick, though they may need some medical services
to accommodate their disability.24
Yet, the disabled collectively are in poorer health and consume
more health care resources than the nondisabled.25  They are four
times more likely to report fair or poor health,26 and are at much
greater risk than the general population of acquiring a host of chronic
diseases.27
Disabled persons may sometimes simply have greater and more ex-
pensive medical needs because of their disability.  For example, a per-
INGS FROM A 2003 SURVEY (2003), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress
.com/2013/01/understanding-the-health-care-needs-and-experiences-of-people-
with-disabilities-findings-from-a-2003-survey.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZM83-
Q8AQ]
21. Id. (finding a vast majority (80%) became disabled later in life, while 9% were
born with a disability or acquired it before age one, and a remaining 10% were
disabled before age eighteen).
22. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., THE FACTS ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY PROGRAM
(2017), https://www.ssa.gov/disabilityfacts/materials/pdf/factsheet.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/S455-YYTY]
23. Gloria L. Krahn et al., Persons with Disabilities as an Unrecognized Health Dis-
parity Population, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S198, S200 (2015).
24. Susan Wendell has captured this relationship between chronic disease and other
disabilities, providing labels of “healthy” disabled and “unhealthy” disabled, to
recognize that not all disabled people can be considered sick or vice versa. Ac-
cording to Wendell, healthy disabled are people with static physical conditions or
functional limitations who don’t face greater or more immediate mortality than
their nondisabled counterparts.  Unhealthy disabled may be more dependent on
medical care maintain their well-being and may face acute or chronic illness that
can contribute to disability and functional impairment. Susan Wendell, Un-
healthy Disabled: Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities, 16 Hypatia, Fall
2001, at 17.
25. Nancy Sharby et al., Decreasing Health Disparities for People with Disabilities
Through Improved Communication Strategies and Awareness, 12 INT’L J. ENVTL.
RES. & PUB. HEALTH 3301 (2015).
26. Krahn et al., supra note 23, at S198.
27. Disabled people are about four times as likely to have heart disease.  They are
also more likely to be diagnosed with diabetes.  Krahn, supra note 23, at S201.
For more general information on health disparities in disabled populations, see
Michael Ulrich, Challenges for People with Disabilities Within the Health Care
Safety Net, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/
11/18/challenges-for-people-with-disabilities-within-the-health-care-safety-net/
[https://perma.unl.edu/VCQ8-76CA].
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son with Multiple Sclerosis may need regular medical check-ups but
also treatment for a variety of symptoms that are a consequence of
that disease, like bladder problems, dizziness, or pain.  And disabled
people may not just need more care, but different care.  For example,
some disabled people require auxiliary aids to interface with the
health care system and the public, which are unique to their condi-
tions and not required by the nondisabled.28
Some of disabled people’s greater medical need may be attributable
to poor access to social determinants of good health, or the social con-
ditions that create and sustain a healthy life.29  For example, disabled
people are less financially secure and are about twice as likely as
others to be unemployed.30  They are also less likely to have a high
school education, or access to internet or adequate transportation.31
They are more likely to be victims of violent crime and to have inade-
quate social and emotional support.32  These social conditions are at-
tributed with poorer health outcomes for disabled and nondisabled
alike.  In addition, social conditions may make the disabled more
likely to engage in health behaviors that can be harmful to their
health.  For example, the disabled are about 1.5 times more likely to
smoke and to be obese and to not participate in physical activity for
leisure.33
These medical and social conditions contribute to a greater need
for health care and thus health insurance on the part of the disabled.
B. Health Insurance and the Disabled
Despite their greater need for medical care and the importance of
that care to integrating the disabled into society, disabled people face
profound challenges with accessing the health care system, both in
facing frequent discrimination in health care delivery34 and—the fo-
28. For examples of common barriers that disabled people face, see Common Barriers
to Participation Experience by People with Disabilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Common Barriers to Participa-
tion], http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/disability-barriers.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/LRY5-YVLU].
29. The Social Determinants of Health: Know What Affects Health, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/socialdeterminants/
[https://perma.unl.edu/7SHR-DYNG]
30. Id.
31. Krahn et al., supra note 23, at S201.
32. Id.
33. These can be a direct result of social barriers to health that the disabled face.  For
example, a double amputee may have a difficult time finding suitable gym equip-
ment to help her participate in cardiovascular exercise.  Ulrich, supra note 27; see
also Common Barriers to Participation, supra note 28 (noting seven common bar-
riers to social and physical participation that individuals with disabilities face).
34. While this Article will focus on health care financing and discrimination, the im-
portance of discrimination in health care delivery should not go unmentioned.  As
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cus of this paper—in obtaining affordable and adequate health care
benefits.  The disabled are twice as likely as the nondisabled to not be
able to access necessary medical care because of cost,35 and they are
more likely to report higher out of pocket expenses.36  Disabled per-
sons are also less likely to receive adequate preventive health care,
meaning that they may not receive care until conditions are more seri-
ous and more difficult and expensive to treat.37
Insurance discrimination takes two primary forms:  discrimination
in who can access insurance and discrimination in what benefits (or
content) they receive.38  Access-based discrimination occurs at the
point of purchase by making distinctions in who can or cannot gain
the Institute of Medicine’s infamous report on discrimination in health care re-
minds us, provider discrimination is also a significant contributor to health care
disparities. Unequal Treatment: What Healthcare Providers Need to Know About
Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare, INST. MED. (Mar. 2002), https://www
.nap.edu/html/10260/disparities_providers.pdf.  Professor Elizabeth Pendo has
written extensively on discrimination in health care delivery against the dis-
abled.  In studying access to reproductive technology for disabled women, for ex-
ample, she uncovered barriers to basic care in the form of “inaccessible tables,
chairs, scales, and mammography equipment.”  Elizabeth Pendo, Shifting the
Conversation: Disability, Disparities and Health Care Reform, 6 FIU L. REV. 87
(2010) [hereinafter Pendo, Shifting the Conversation]. See also Elizabeth Pendo,
Disability, Equipment Barriers, and Women’s Health: Using the ADA to Provide
Meaningful Access, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 15 (2008) (noting that
those with disabilities receive less education and health care than those without).
Others have written on potential rationing of care against the disabled by provid-
ers who view care as medically futile, when it does not achieve a level of medical
benefit of the same degree as for the nondisabled.  Mary Crossley, Medical Futil-
ity and Disability Discrimination, 81 IOWA L. REV. 179 (1995); see also David
Orentlicher, Destructuring Disability, Rationing of Healthcare and Unfair Dis-
crimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1996) (suggesting
two possible ways of rationing health care that would have the least discrimina-
tory effect on the disabled).
35. Common Barriers to Participation, supra note 28.
36. In all fifty states, the disabled report cost as a barrier to care more frequently
than the nondisabled. Common Barriers to Participation, supra note 28.  For
more information, see Nancy A. Miller et al., The Relation Between Health Insur-
ance and Health Care Disparities Among Adults with Disabilities, 104 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH e85 (2014).
37. For example, disabled women have been shown to receive less preventive health
care and cancer screening, like mammograms and cervical cancer screenings.
Krahn et al., supra note 23, at S198.  This can be in part due to insurance cover-
age and also do to structural barriers in the health care setting.  Pendo, Shifting
the Conversation, supra note 36.
38. Rosenbaum, supra note 15, at 109–11 (providing examples of access-level dis-
crimination and content-level discrimination).  Professor Rosenbaum also identi-
fies a third level, micro-level discrimination, or discrimination at the level of an
individual’s claim for health care.  We will not focus on micro-level discrimination
in this Article.  Also for general background on insurance discrimination at access
and content levels, see Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in
Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 80 (2005).
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entry to an insurance plan.39  For example, an insurer might refuse or
disincentive the enrollment of a person with significant disabilities
into a given insurance plan.40  In content-level discrimination, the dis-
abled person is allowed to purchase the insurance, but they are
treated differently in what benefits they receive.41  For example, disa-
bility-specific benefits might be excluded form coverage, or there
might be annual limits that disabled people need to go over.42
These limits in health insurance at the access and content levels
may be equally harmful to disabled persons’ health but they may also
often be necessary to control health care spending, whether in private
or public insurance.43  Only sometimes will these actions be unlawful
from a civil rights perspective.44  This Article does not seek to formally
define which counts as unlawful health insurance discrimination
against the disabled under civil rights law.  Instead, it underscores
the fact that courts have not been recognizing content-level discrimi-
nation, while they do consider access-level discrimination, despite
both being equally problematic to disabled people’s health (and both
being a vehicle in which insurers can and do control for health care
costs).45  It advocates for courts viewing both types of discrimination
within the purview of disability antidiscrimination law.46  This next
section describes how health insurance discrimination against the dis-
abled takes shape in both public and private settings.
39. Rosenbaum, supra note 15.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Though U.S. health expenditures have slowed, the country still spends more than
other countries of equal economic development and without evidence of better
health outcomes. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, U.S. HEALTHCARE FROM A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: SPENDING, USE OF SERVICES, AND HEALTH IN 13 COUNTRIES, http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/oct/
1819_squires_us_hlt_care_global_perspective_oecd_intl_brief_v 3.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/6NP5-4R2W]; see Medicaid Managed Care for People with Disabili-
ties, NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.ncd.gov/publica
tions/2013/20130315/ [https://perma.unl.edu/M2UU-58GP] (discussing how pub-
lic expenditure cuts in health care can particularly disenfranchise the disabled).
44. In using the term health insurance discrimination, however, I do not mean to
suggest that all conduct on the part of insurers is unlawful or unethical, or even
violates antidiscrimination law.  Instead, I simply mean to suggest that disabled
people are sometimes treated differently as a class than the nondisabled in insur-
ance.  Crossley, supra note 38, at 80 (acknowledging that only certain forms of
health insurance discrimination would violate civil rights laws).
45. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9 (explaining how the courts draw a doctrinal distinction
between access to benefits and content of benefits, allowing insurers to discrimi-
nate in health insurance in their benefit design).
46. For an excellent discussion of the normative considerations surrounding insur-
ance discrimination, see Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is
(and Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 GA. L. REV. 833 (2016).
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1. Public Insurance
About 50% of the disabled population has a form of public health
insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid.47
Medicaid is the first line of defense for the disabled in health insur-
ance.48  Medicaid is available to disabled persons either because they
have low incomes or because they cannot work and qualify for Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) benefits.49  The ACA expanded Medi-
caid, broadening the group of disabled who may be eligible to any
adult who makes below 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL).50  The
Supreme Court made the expansion optional for the states in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.51  Several studies sug-
gest that the chronically ill and low-income persons with health
problems experienced the greatest increase in insurance coverage
from the Medicaid expansion.52  Medicare also covers some disabled if
they are either over age of sixty-five, or under the age of sixty-five but
cannot work and qualify for Social Security disability (SSD)
benefits.53
Public insurers are unlikely to engage in access-based discrimina-
tion in regards to who is eligible to enroll, since eligibility is statuto-
47. Miller et al., supra note 36.
48. Dee Mahan et al., Cutting Medicaid: Harming Seniors and People with Disabili-
ties Who Need Long-Term Care, FAMILIES USA (May 2011), http://familiesusa.org/
product/cutting-medicaid-harming-seniors-and-people-disabilities-who-need-
long-term-care [https://perma.unl.edu/SP7S-8HZL] (describing in particular why
Medicaid coverage is uniquely important for disabled populations).
49. Other “worthy poor” are also covered including certain children, women, some
parents from low income homes, and elderly with low income who can qualify for
Medicare and Medicaid (dual-eligibles).  Mary Beth Musumeci, The Affordable
Care Act’s Impact on Medicaid Eligibility, Enrollment, and Benefits for People
with Disabilities, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 8, 2014), http://kff.org/health-re-
form/issue-brief/the-affordable-care-acts-impact-on-medicaid-eligibility-enroll-
ment-and-benefits-for-people-with-disabilities/ [https://perma.unl.edu/F9PB-
U5DQ].
50. Id.
51. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  To date, thirty-two
states, including Washington D.C., have expanded Medicaid. Status of State Ac-
tion on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (July 7, 2016),
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-
medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ [https://perma.unl.edu/75PT-FWYU].
52. STEPHEN LINDER ET AL., URBAN INST., THE IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A 2015 STATUS REPORT (2016), http://www.urban
.org/research/publication/impact-affordable-care-act-people-disabilities-2015-sta-
tus-report/view/full_report [https://perma.unl.edu/EP8E-VAR4].
53. Patients with end-stage renal disease or Lou Gehrig’s disease may also qualify
for Medicare benefits. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) & Medicare
Coverage, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/people-with-disabilities/
ssdi-and-medicare/ [https://perma.unl.edu/VN42-D9L6].
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rily defined by income, age, or some other definable standard.54
However, these insurers can sometimes engage in content discrimina-
tion by designing insurance benefits that fail to provide generous
enough or specialized health benefits for the disabled.55
For example, the Medicaid benefit package is better designed for
disabled populations than other insurance plans,56 but even post-
ACA, it does not cover some critical services like durable medical
equipment, dental, and vision, and states have broad freedom to de-
fine benefits outside of a select group of mandatory benefits.57  Medi-
caid also maintains some plans that involve managed care elements,
which can be challenging for disabled people with significant health
needs.58  The Medicaid expansion is also limited in its ability to im-
54. The inability of public insurers to turn away the sick and the disabled make such
programs function as a safety net, especially during the time periods in which
private insurers could discriminate on the basis of health status, particularly
with preexisting conditions.  Professor Rosenbaum demonstrates the importance
of these programs because they cannot discriminate in access:
In contrast to insurance markets, Medicaid coverage is available at the
very point that serious health need arises.  The law contains no eligibil-
ity exclusions for pre-existing conditions; many of its numerous eligibil-
ity categories are expressly designed to deal with coverage during
illness; and states are required to provide for enrollment services in
health care settings in order to enable enrollment at the point of health
care need.
Rosenbaum, supra note 15, at 104.
55. See Anita Silvers & Leslie Francis, Human Rights, Civil Rights: Prescribing Dis-
ability Discrimination Prevention in Packaging Essential Health Benefits, 41 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS, no. 4, Winter 2013 (arguing that even public benefits can dis-
criminate against the disabled “often on the ground that they cannot be made
functional, or . . . that it is too costly to make them functional”).
56. As one interviewee in a disability activist group stated:
For people with significant disabilities, insurance just doesn’t work.
Medicaid is really what you need . . . . Insurance doesn’t pay for what we
need.  It doesn’t pay for outdoor, heavy-duty wheelchairs; it doesn’t pay
for personal assistance.  I guess it pays for medications, doctor visits,
that kind of stuff.  But the big expenses are really what people consider
long-term care.
LINDER ET AL., supra note 52, at 29.
57. Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963,
1993 (2013) (“Despite being the primary source of health insurance for people
with disabilities, Medicaid has several shortcomings that contribute to the health
disparities experienced by the disability community . . . beneficiaries have trouble
locating health-care providers who will accept Medicaid payments . . . .  Health-
care professionals who serve Medicaid recipients with disabilities report impedi-
ments to providing care resulting from improper referrals and accessibility issues
. . . .  Additionally, Medicaid only provides limited coverage.  It fails to cover many
essential services, such as dental, vision, and personal assistance, as well as du-
rable medical equipment.”).
58. Roberts, supra note 57, at 1993 (“Medicaid managed care programs suffer from
poor coordination of care, reduced consumer choice, and a limited ability to access
specialists, thereby negatively impacting health care for people with disabili-
ties.”). See also LINDER ET AL., supra note 52 (explaining Medicaid administrators
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prove health for disabled persons.  Foremost, the true benefit cannot
be reached unless all states expand.59  Without expansion in all
states, approximately 17.8 million people remain uninsured who could
otherwise have coverage,60 and the poorest in our country may not be
eligible for either federal subsidies or Medicaid.61  But even in states
that expanded, the expansion population (with some exceptions) is not
entitled to receive the same level of benefits as other previously cov-
ered Medicaid populations and instead may receive benefit packages
that are more in line with private insurance (and thus not as well tai-
lored for the disabled).62  Some experts have reported less favorable
insurance for disabled persons in states that have not standardized
indicated that concern that Medicaid managed care entities “lacked experience
delivering long term care for people with disabilities and that the groups would
have an incentive to reduce services under a capitated rate.”).
59. Sidney D. Watson, Embracing Justice Roberts’ New Medicaid, 6 ST. LOUIS J.
HEALTH POL’Y & L. 247, 263 (2013) (“Voluntarily expanding Medicaid and assur-
ing that everyone has access to affordable health insurance makes sense for
states.  New Medicaid makes sense as a matter of public health, healthcare deliv-
ery and state finances.  Most importantly, though, New Medicaid makes political
sense: It creates a safety net for all and is likely to become one of the Nation’s
most popular social insurance programs.”); see also Nicole Huberfeld & Jessica L.
Roberts, Medicaid Expansion as Completion of the Great Society, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. SLIP OPINIONS 1, 5–6 (2014) (“[W]hether to expand Medicaid is a social jus-
tice matter, not just an economic or political issue . . . .  [W]hen the Supreme
Court made Medicaid expansion optional for the States, it eroded the ACA’s pri-
mary purpose.”).
60. GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., URBAN INST., MAKING THE MEDICAID EXPANSION AN
ACA OPTION: HOW MANY LOW-INCOME AMERICANS COULD REMAIN UNINSURED
(2012), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412606-
Making-the-Medicaid-Expansion-an-ACA-Option-How-Many-Low-Income-Amer-
icans-Could-Remain-Uninsured-.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8HS4-KFHM].
61. This is a quirk in the law known as the Medicaid gap.  Subsidies only apply to
those within 100–400% of the federal poverty line (FPL), and Medicaid covers up
to 133% only in states that expand.  In states that do not expand one could have
income from 0%–100% of the FPL and not be covered by either Medicaid or subsi-
dies.  Rachel Garfield & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor
Adults in States That Do Not Expand Medicaid—An Update, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-
uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid-an-update/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/N83P-JDYR].
62. Julia Paradise, Medicaid Moving Forward, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/medicaid-moving-forward/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/7KSQ-G68F] (“[M]ost adults in the new Medicaid expansion group re-
ceive ‘Alternative Benefit Plans’ (ABPs) . . . .  Compared to traditional Medicaid
benefits for adults, ABPs based on commercial insurance products may provide
broader coverage of some services (e.g., behavioral health care, preventive care)
and narrower coverage of other services (e.g., prescription drugs, long-term ser-
vices) . . . .  Certain populations must have access to all Medicaid state plan bene-
fits, even if they are eligible for Medicaid through the new adult expansion group.
They include individuals who are medically frail or have special medical needs,
including people with disabling mental health disorders and complex medical
conditions, dual eligible beneficiaries, and specified other beneficiary groups.”).
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their Medicaid expansion benefits to match the pre-expansion pack-
ages.63  Expanding Medicaid to all states could reduce some access is-
sues, but adequacy of benefits remains an open question for both
expansion and non-expansion populations.
Medicare also poses some ongoing problems for the disabled, even
after the ACA. Medicare, like Medicaid, is better designed than pri-
vate insurance to take into account disabled health care needs.64  Af-
ter all, it intentionally covers some disabled, and it is designed to
tolerate costlier health care consumption, given its elderly population
focus.65  However, Medicare is notorious for having high out-of-pocket
costs, which can differentially harm the disabled, and the ACA has
only partially addressed this issue.66
2. Private Insurance
About 43% of disabled people use private insurance, whether in the
form of employer-sponsored, small-group, or individual insurance.67
Private insurance presents a greater opportunity for disability-
based and other discrimination.68  Private insurers face pressure from
shareholders to save money and earn profits and from consumers to
keep premiums low.69  Private insurers must also adjust for adverse
selection, the phenomenon whereby individuals fail to purchase insur-
ance until they know they need it, resulting in more people taking
from instead of paying into the insurance pool.70
63. LINDER ET AL., supra note 52.
64. Particularly this is so as public systems have been designed to accept all enrollees
based on designated criteria like age or disability, and not based on risk rating.
65. Medicare is the elderly health insurance program, designed for persons over the
age of sixty-five.
66. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1994–95 (arguing that Medicare can be overly
costly for the disabled).  Some ACA provisions have tackled Medicare’s cost-shar-
ing issues, for example provisions that make cost-sharing for Medicare Part D
prescription drugs less. Closing the Coverage Gap—Medicare Prescription Drugs
Are Becoming More Affordable, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDI-
CARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11493.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
6CGH-WPZ3].  Additionally, low income disabled may be dual-eligible (qualifying
for both Medicare and Medicaid).  Medicaid then defrays some of their expenses
from Medicare.
67. Miller et al., supra note 36, at e85.
68. See Roberts, supra note 57, at 1995–97 (discussing the ways that private insur-
ance benefits can be too narrow for the disabled as a population).
69. See Crossley, supra note 38.
70. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 380 (2003) (providing background on ad-
verse selection). See also Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health
Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and
Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 280 (2012) (“Insurers in an unregulated, voluntary
market segment the market by classifying risks into smaller groups. Thus, the
strength of the spirit of solidarity may depend on the price of insurance and the
degree to which people prefer not to be classified as a high risk.”).
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Pre-ACA, private insurers were at great liberty to discriminate
both in access to and content of insurance as a way of segregating the
market according to risk of health care consumption and avoiding
high cost consumers or shifting cost back onto them through high cost-
sharing.71  Any type of sickness might expose one to both access and
content based discrimination, no matter how minor or severe the ill-
ness.72  This was particularly felt in the small group and individual
insurance markets where risk is only spread onto a few, but such dis-
crimination could also occur in large group insurance, like employer
plans.73
Access-wise, insurers could bar the entry of persons who seemed to
present too great a risk to the insurer.  These included people with
preexisting conditions or other traits that, from an actuarial perspec-
tive, might predict high future health care consumption (for example,
evidence of past health care consumption or evidence of domestic
abuse).74  If insurers enrolled a high-risk individual, they might offset
that risk by charging higher premiums, or by terminating or refusing
to renew insurance for that person the following year.75
Discriminatory benefit design was also a useful risk sorting mecha-
nism that functioned both to shield the insurer from paying for high
cost services, but also to discourage enrollment by risky consumers
who were seeking more generous insurance packages.76  Medical ne-
cessity reviews were one such mechanism, limiting services to only
those who reach some defined level of improvement which may be un-
attainable for some disabled (even though they might achieve their
71. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the Affordable Care
Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for Persons with Disabilities, 25 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 532–35 (2011).  Rosenbaum, supra note 15,
at 103–04.
72. For example, Kaiser Family Foundation conducted an experiment pre-ACA in
which “mock” scenarios were used to see when insurers would underwrite to ex-
clude certain types of preexisting conditions in the individual market.  Insurers
denied patients, excluded coverage for conditions, and raised premiums/cost-
sharing for even minor conditions like hay fever.  People with more serious condi-
tions like HIV were uninsurable and patients with costly conditions like depres-
sion had prohibitively high premiums (as much as over $800 per month). KAREN
POLLITZ, RICHARD SORIAN & KATHY THOMAS, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HOW ACCES-
SIBLE IS INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR CONSUMERS LESS-THAN-PERFECT
HEALTH? (2001), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/
how-accessible-is-individual-health-insurance-for-consumer-in-less-than-perfect-
health-report.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/X3E5-3GWD].
73. See Crossley, supra note 38, at 84 (arguing that small group insurers are more
likely to avoid high-risk enrollees).
74. See Stone, supra note 1.
75. Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at 106; Crossley, supra note 36.
76. Crossley, supra note 38, at 82.
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own different improvement).77  Insurers might also exclude or limit
certain services, for example, by not covering certain rehabilitative
services or by placing an annual cap on the amount of covered ser-
vice.78  Particularly, this was true for services that were uniquely re-
quired by disabled people and not by the general population, like
auxiliary aids or wheelchairs.79  The failure of insurers to cover long-
term and chronic illness in favor of treating acute conditions was an-
other mechanism.80  Insurers might also exclude certain providers
from their networks who serve high-risk populations81 or use cost-
sharing mechanisms (high deductibles, copays, and coinsurance) to
penalize and discourage doctor’s visits.82  Professor Bagenstos views
this discrimination in the private insurance market in access and ben-
efits as not only a health care access issue for the disabled but also a
significant undermining of the goals of civil rights law to integrate the
disabled into the workforce.83  By not being properly insurable in the
private market, the disabled are forced to stop working in order to be
eligible for public insurance products.84
77. Id.  For example, an insurer might only cover physical therapy services for pa-
tients who will recover full range of motion in their knee and fail to cover services
that could make a disabled person somewhat mobile or at least comfortable when
bed-bound. See also SARA ROSENBAUM, STATEMENT ON ESSENTIAL BENEFITS 2
(2011) (discussing medical necessity reviews as a form of insurance
discrimination).
78. Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 54 (“Rationing by service may result in coverage for
persons with a milder form of an illness while leaving those with a more severe
form of the same illness uncovered.”).
79. See Bagenstos, supra note 1 (discussing how an emphasis in private insurance on
acute care can draw away from resources for chronic disease and long-term care
needs).
80. Id. at 30.
81. Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reform, 16
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 63, 74, 77 (2015) (arguing that failure to exclude aca-
demic medical centers that specialize in tertiary and quaternary care can be a
way of avoiding the chronically ill).
82. Heavy cost-sharing has been shown to successfully reduce health care consump-
tion, especially in low-income people, even when the services are medically neces-
sary.  RAND has specifically argued against heavy cost-sharing in modern
insurance plans because they lead consumers to simply avoid health care,
equally, whether medically necessary or not. The Health Insurance Experiment:
A Classic RAND Study Speaks to the Current Health Reform Debate, RAND
CORP. 4–5 (2006), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9174.html [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/5VW3-4GTK]. See also Rosenbaum, supra note 74, at 538 (argu-
ing that cost-sharing can be an even more effective tool to avoid health care
spending than avoiding consumers based on risk-rating with premium
adjustments).
83. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 129–30 (2009).
84. Id.
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The ACA expanded access to private health insurance by mandat-
ing that certain employers provide insurance85 and by making pri-
vately-purchased health insurance in the small group and individual
markets more affordable through subsidies and tax credits for pur-
chasers who income qualify.86  The ACA also widely eliminated dis-
crimination in private health insurance, but some opportunities for
insurance discrimination remain.  Private insurance is now more akin
to public insurance in that access-based discrimination has largely
been eradicated and most ongoing issues of discrimination or limita-
tions occur at the level of generosity of benefits.
In terms of fighting access discrimination, private insurers must
now guarantee issue87 and renewability88 of benefits, instead of limit-
ing eligibility later for poor health status.  Insurers also cannot deny
initial enrollment in plans on the basis of a preexisting condition,89 or
a variety of other health-status related factors like physical or mental
condition, claims history (the number of claims per patient), medical
history, use of health care, genetic information, disability, or other evi-
dence of insurability.90  Insurers can only vary premiums based on a
few factors (tobacco use, age, geography) and cannot vary premiums
based on health-status, health consumption, or disability.91  Allowing
insurers to still vary premiums on the basis of tobacco use, age, and
geography may contribute to ongoing health care disparities, particu-
larly for the disabled.92  While there is still some potential to discrimi-
nate in access and in premiums, for the most part we have seen great
enrollment of higher risk health care consumers than previously
which may further create incentives for insurers to reduce services on
the benefit side.
The essential health benefits (EHBs) provision is the primary tool
of the ACA to combat health benefits discrimination.93  It creates ten
general categories of EHBs in which insurers must cover certain ser-
vices, forcing insurers to offer some level of standardized benefits to
85. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1513, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012) (im-
posing penalties on employers of certain sizes if they do not provide essential
health services to full-time employees).
86. Id. §§ 1401–1402, 26 U.S.C. § 36B.
87. Id. § 2702, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1.
88. Id. § 2703, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2.
89. See id. § 2704, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a).
90. See id. § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
91. Rates can increase threefold between ages of 18–65, and tobacco users can be
charged 1.5 times more.  Allowances in premiums for age, geography, and tobacco
use have been criticized for perpetuating health disparities.
92. These may have a significant disparate effect on the disabled who smoke more
and may frequently be older or live in lower income areas. See Roberts, supra
note 1, at 1188.
93. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18022
(2012).
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enrollees regardless of their likely level of health care consumption.
Of particular importance to the disabled, EHBs require coverage of
mental health and substance use disorder services, prescription drugs,
and rehabilitative/habilitative services.94
The statute, along with DHHS, define the broad categories of
EHBs.  What actually gets covered depends heavily on the individual
states, which are tasked with selecting a benchmark plan that pro-
vides the baseline for coverage for all insurance plans offered on ex-
changes.  This benchmark plan is typically the state employee plan, or
a plan that reflects the highest enrollment on the small/individual
group market.95  All plans offered on the exchange must meet the
same level of benefits as the state benchmark plan.
EHBs are subject to a nondiscrimination requirement.  The Secre-
tary of Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) must not
discriminate on the basis of “age, disability, or expected length of
life”96 and must consider the particular health needs of “women, chil-
dren, persons with disabilities, and other groups” in establishing the
EHBs.97  The Secretary must also review plans periodically for
whether they are preventing people from getting medical necessary
care because of cost or access challenges.98  There are no clear antidis-
crimination rules for the States in selecting their benchmarks, how-
ever.  There is some amount of uncertainty as to how broad reaching
these antidiscrimination efforts are.99
The benchmark plan should cover all essential health benefits, but
in practice it can still have great variation in what does or does not get
covered.  The plans are not necessarily thoroughly reviewed for com-
pliance with EHB national standards and antidiscrimination stan-
dards, and why plans are picked is not always transparent.  Clearly,
94. Id. EHBs’ other categories include: ambulatory patient services (outpatient
care), emergency care, hospitalization, maternity/pregnancy care, laboratory ser-
vices, preventive and wellness services, and pediatric care including oral and
vision.
95. See State Health Insurance Mandates and the Essential Health Benefits Provi-
sion, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
health/ state-ins-mandates-and-aca-essential-benefits.aspx#State_EHB_2013
[https://perma.unl.edu/738L-4PUG] (providing an overview of state benchmarks).
96. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(B)
(2012).
97. See id. § 18022(b)(4)(C).
98. See id. § 18022(b)(4)(G)(i).
99. See David D. Johnson, Anti-Discrimination Law Comes to Health Benefit Design:
Is DHHS Getting the Rules Right?, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Nov. 2015, at 32 (asking
whether discriminatory benefit designs only encompass specific measures men-
tioned in the rules like cost-sharing, or whether they also encompass other mech-
anism like narrow provider designs?). See also Govind Persad, Priority Setting,
Cost-Effectiveness, and the ACA, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 119 (2015) (asking whether
discrimination in the context of EHBs still allows for medically necessity
determinations).
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the benchmark plan’s coverage is critical.100  A generous benchmark
means generous benefits for all consumers, while a benchmark plans
with serious gaps in coverage means these gaps will be replicated
throughout the entire state.  This potential for variability has been
sharply criticized generally101 and for its impact on the disabled spe-
cifically.102  For example, stakeholders in one state’s insurance ex-
change noted that “habilitative, mental health, and equipment
services became less accessible on private insurance plans because the
state chose the ‘cheapest essential benefits, maybe not considering all
the impacts for all consumers.’”103  Another example are states that
pick model plans that allow a “fail-first” coverage model, i.e., the indi-
vidual can only have access to the drug after showing first that other
drugs have failed.104  This can be problematic for disabled populations
who frequently rely on a combination of drugs.105  Insurers may also
continue to define medical necessity to only cover benefits that im-
prove functioning or recover lost functioning, leaving out disabled
100. For example, see KATIE KEITH ET AL., GEORGETOWN U. HEALTH POL’Y INST., NON-
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (July 2013), https://ssa
scholars.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/jhppl/files/nondiscriminationunderthe
aca_georgetownchir.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3C6D-THUM] (describing how
“[m]ost states did not analyze whether their essential health benefits benchmark
plan included discriminatory features” while the “benchmark selection process
was not transparent in many states”).
101. Wendy K. Mariner, Health Insurance is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40
AM. J.L. & MED. 195, 208 (2014) (“[V]ariation in EHB definitions can perpetuate
a problem that the EHB requirement itself was intended to resolve or at least
reduce—inconsistent or inadequate treatment coverage. . . . The remaining varia-
tion among the several public benefit programs and hundreds of private insur-
ance plans can provoke complaints of unfair rationing, especially if a person who
is denied treatment believes that the denial was not based on medical need, but
on an insurer’s profit targets.”). See also Silvers & Francis, supra note 55 (noting
concerns with plan variations).
102. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, A Lost Opportunity for Persons with Disabil-
ities? The Final Essential Health Benefits Rule, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 11,
2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/11/a-lost-opportunity-for-persons-
with-disabilities-the-final-essential-health-benefits-rule/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
SZ9V-XDE9]; see also LINDER ET AL., supra note 52, at 50 (discussing the vari-
ances in state benchmark plans).
103. Another state official observed:
Physical, occupational, and speech therapy: 60 visits per condition, per
lifetime.  That’s it.  And that is whether it’s rehabilitation, which is
regaining function, or habilitation, which would be maintaining func-
tion.  Home health care: 40 visits a year.  Skilled nursing: 200 days per
year.  Medical equipment: standard equipment only.  Hearing aid: one
single purchase every three years.  One external prosthetic device per
limb, per lifetime.  God forbid you ever need a different prosthesis.
LINDER ET AL., supra note 52, at 37.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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groups who may not reap the same definable benefit as
nondisabled.106
DHHS has adjusted its final rules to address a number of coverage
issues, particularly to improve access to health and substance abuse,
habilitative services, and pediatric oral and vision services, suggesting
that annual revisits of the rules will be necessary to monitor state
compliance.107  DHHS has indicated that it will allow states to select
model benchmark plans into 2017 and will be reviewing the practice
for how it affects enrollees.108
Ultimately, further discrimination in benefits post-ACA will be
“subtle, but potent” and probably only exposed slowly through cus-
tomer complaints and litigation.109  For example, while insurers will
no longer have direct annual or lifetime dollars limits for EHBs, they
can achieve the same result others ways.  The post-ACA market re-
flects high deductibles and high copays in many plans, which can dif-
ferentially impact high consumers of health care who are more likely
to need health services.110  One popular practice is drug tiering, where
insurers place certain specialty drugs on higher cost-sharing tiers,
barring the insured from accessing the drug unless he can afford the
copayment.111  This insurance design has proven to cost people sev-
eral extra thousands of dollars to be able to access their necessary
medicines beyond what they may already pay in deductibles and pre-
miums.112  The ACA caps these out-of-pocket expenditures, but high
health care consumers may find themselves reaching that limit each
and every year. These types of plans may further entrench the trends
in the disabled populations of having higher out-of-pocket cost and be-
ing more likely to be unable to pay for needed care.113  While savvy
consumers may be able to find plans that offer them the best cost-
106. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 102.
107. John V. Jacobi et al., Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care
Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory
Reform, 120 PENN ST. L.  REV. 109, 120–29 (2015).
108. Id. at 128.
109. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 102.
110. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 71, at 534.
111. Douglas B. Jacobs & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate—Ad-
verse Selection in the Insurance Marketplace, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 399, 399–402
(2015).
112. Id. See also Spenser G. Benge, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: An Effec-
tive Means of Combatting Health Insurers’ Discrimination Against Individuals
with HIV/AIDS?, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 193, 205–207 (2016) (stating cost for
brand name and generic AIDS medication and cost including various insurance
plans).
113. LINDER ET AL., supra note 52, at 37 (“There are people with disabilities in the pool
who are purchasing private insurance through the Marketplace and then when
they try to use it they’re discovering—as many other people are too—that the
copays are keeping them from receiving health care services.”).
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sharing, purchasing the best insurance can be difficult for the disabled
for a number of reasons.114
Even with improved regulation of the benefits themselves, there is
still a matter of adequate coverage of providers.  Disabled people may
see many, often costly, providers, and it might be impossible to find a
plan that covers all necessary providers.  Many insurers are moving
toward narrow provider networks that do not contract with academic
medical centers that provide the only specialty tertiary and quater-
nary care that disabled people need.115  Or the model state plans may
seek to avoid paying for certain services or providers by only making
them available out-of-network and imposing high cost-sharing.116
And “[e]ven if plans are equitable on paper, discrimination may oc-
cur in their administration.”117  For example, an investigation into a
New York behavioral health subcontractor by the state attorney gen-
eral showed that the insurer denied coverage at the individual patient
claims level 64% more frequently in behavioral health than in medical
claims, despite legal protections that suggest that behavioral health
ought to be covered to the same degree as other types of health
care.118
These are just some examples of claims of insurance discrimination
coming out of the insurance markets post-ACA.  Cuts and limits in
benefits can be important mechanisms for insurers to control rising
health care costs, promote quality of health care, and ensure that only
medically necessary care is delivered, but these mechanisms can also
simply be driven by profit-seeking.  Even with rational economic in-
tentions, such mechanisms may still differentially impact the dis-
abled, harming their ability to access necessary medical care at rates
that they can afford.  Moreover, discriminatory benefit design (in pub-
lic or private insurance) may reflect an insurance system that is not
114. While some plans may offer higher premiums in exchange for better cost-sharing,
these plans are not always available.  Moreover, it can be difficult for disabled
people to know which if any insurance will adequately address their health
needs.  Coverage documents can be difficult to obtain and understand and some-
times are only available after an individual has already signed up for the plan.
The use of navigators to help inform insurance purchases can be particularly im-
portant for this group as the purchasing decisions can be complex and the inter-
faces to purchase can sometimes be inaccessible for certain disabled populations.
Yet many insurers are moving toward avoiding or reducing this service, which
can be another challenge for the disabled.  Linder, supra note 52, at 39–40.
115. See Blake, supra note 81.
116. LINDER ET AL., supra note 52, at 4.
117. Jacobi et al., supra note 107, at 175.
118. Id.  Examples of such denials included denial of residential treatment for a pa-
tient with life-threatening anorexia nervosa and requirements that substance
abusers must face life-threatening withdrawal to be eligible for inpatient hospital
coverage.
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fully considering the disabled population when it designs its benefits
or is making value judgments about the worth of disabled patients.119
While this Article contemplates discrimination by health insurers
post adoption of the Affordable Care Act, there is also a possibility at
the time of writing this Article, that the ACA will be repealed or will
undergo dramatic reformation.120  Efforts to reduce protections
against health-status discrimination or to reduce access to insurance
will only make civil rights approaches to addressing health insurance
discrimination more important as regulatory frameworks are
undermined.
C. The Role for Civil Rights in Health Insurance
The ACA has done a great deal to advance the interests of the dis-
abled in health care but some benefits discrimination is still possible.
History tells us that such discrimination will run rampant if the ACA
is repealed.  Antidiscrimination law is a critical strategy to combat
health insurance discrimination, whether the ACA stands or smol-
ders.  Before turning to Alexander v. Choate and the access/content
distinction, which is the most significant barrier to workable antidis-
crimination law in this arena, it is worth briefly contextualizing other
barriers to civil rights in health insurance
Disability civil rights laws have frequently been criticized for fall-
ing short in their promises to fully integrate the disabled into society
generally.121  This is true even more so in health care, which has not
119. As Professor Orentlicher notes, rationing decisions may “reflect not only technical
medical judgments but also value judgments about the proper balance between
medical costs and benefits.”  Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 60.
120. President Trump has made the ACA repeal and replacement an early goal of his
presidency, though it is unclear at this time about when and if Congress will
approve a repeal and whether they have a suitable replacement.  Maggie Haber-
man & Robert Pear, Trump Tells Congress to Repeal and Replace Health Care
Law “Very Quickly”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
01/10/us/repeal-affordable-care-act-donald-trump.html.  House Republicans re-
buffed the Administration’s first effort at replacing the ACA. See Robert Pear,
Thomas Kaplan & Maggie Haberman, In Major Defeat for Trump, Push to Repeal
Health Law Fails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/
24/us/politics/health-care-affordable-care-act.html?_r=0. For an overview of why
the ACA was put into place and some of the possible replacement proposals, see
generally Timothy Jost, Taking Stock of Health Reform: Where We’ve Been, Where
We’re Going, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 6, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2016/12/06/taking-stock-of-health-reform-where-weve-been-where-were-going/
[https://perma.unl.edu/49DV-83HA].
121. See Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessi-
ble to All, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 390 (2003) (“Congress itself placed limits
on this promise [of inclusion] by including eligibility requirements and undue
burden/fundamental alteration exceptions on access requirements.  The courts
have further eroded the impact of the ADA and section 504 through a series of
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enjoyed as much progress in litigation as other areas, like education or
employment.122  In the health care context, this may be in part due to
uncertainty in the past about to what extent these laws applied to
health insurance.  The Rehab Act reached only public insurance like
Medicare and Medicaid.123  The ADA was typically viewed by courts
to reach private insurance,124 but there has been some amount of dis-
agreement as to that, and, in either case, there is an exemption in the
law for insurers engaging in underwriting.125  Even if courts can
agree that the ADA applied, then, well-founded financial discrimina-
interpretations that have narrowed the scope of who is protected by these stat-
utes and limited the substance of what constitutes equal access.”); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational
Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 923 (2004) (explaining the Supreme Court
“has taken a decidedly restrictive view of the proper scope of federal disability
discrimination law.”); Tucker, supra note 14, at 338–39 (“[C]ourts are not enforc-
ing the law, but instead are finding incredibly inventive means of interpreting
the ADA to achieve the opposite result that the Act was intended to achieve.
Judges are only people, generally people without disabilities, who are not yet
willing to change the rules of society to require themselves or others to act as
good Samaritans.”); see also Roberts, supra note 57, at 1976 (arguing that the
adoption of the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008
was “an attempt to restore the statute to its original state” after “restrictive court
interpretations.”).
122. Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 65 (“[T]he courts have developed the principle of
reasonable accommodations primarily in non-medical contexts.”); Roberts, supra
note 57, at 2002 (“[M]uch like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA has not had a
meaningful impact on access to health care for people with disabilities.”).
123. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no qualified individual with a
disability shall “solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  Rehabilitation Act of
1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).  Public insurers financed by the federal gov-
ernment fall under this provision.
124. Most courts view insurers as a place of public accommodation regulated by Title
III of the ADA.  ADA Title III provides that “no individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of pub-
lic accommodation” by the owner, lessee, or operator of such a place.  42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a) (2012).  Some courts held that insurance was not regulated by the
ADA because it was not a public accommodation, however.  For a detailed discus-
sion of these various courts’ stances, see Timothy Frey, Your Insurance Does Not
Cover That: Disability-Based Discrimination Where It Hurts the Most, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 636 (2010).
125. Title V of the ADA, provides that “this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or
restrict— (1) an insurer. . .health maintenance organization, or any agent, or
entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not in-
consistent with State law . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012).  There is some limit
on this, in that underwriting should not be a “subterfuge” to allow discrimination.
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2012).
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tion was always seen as beyond the reach of the law.126  Civil rights
laws have also been viewed as particularly complex to apply in the
context of health care financing.127
Beyond the limits of the law, there has been a historical reluctance
on the part of disability advocates to focus on health benefits out of
fear that such advocacy would be seen as wrongfully favoring a medi-
cal over a social view of disability.128  The medical model of disability
saw disability as a medical abnormality in which the disabled body
needed to be made to fit the environment around it.129  This model
was critiqued for viewing disabled people as less capable simply be-
cause the world was built with recognizing their bodies and needs.130
It also forced medicalization into disabled who are not “sick”131 or can-
126. Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18
L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 340 (1990).  As Professor Parmet noted in early
writings after the adoption of the ADA, “the ability to . . . shape benefit plans to
discriminate against disabilities may well have the effect of undermining many of
the Act’s antidiscrimination goals.  If benefits packages can be structured to dis-
proportionately harm the disabled, the prejudice and stigmatization that the
ADA attempts to outlaw may come in the back door.”  For a history of the wide
acceptance of actuarially fair discrimination in health insurance, see Crossley,
supra note 38.
127. Decisions about insurance coverage are “complex, multifactorial decisions.  As a
result, trying to tease out what role disability plays in the decision-making pro-
cess and whether that role should be deemed legitimate or illegitimate can be
quite problematic.”  Crossley, supra note 1, at 53.  Moreover, civil rights law and
health care financing can be contradictory in their goals.  “[T]he law of health
care financing rests heavily on the law of insurance, which in turn emphasizes
the legality of exclusion and risk avoidance. In contrast, civil rights laws enacted
to protect persons with disabilities are fundamentally intended to advance the
societal embrace of individuals whose health status can carry the potential for a
greater consumption of resources.” See Rosenbaum, supra note 8, at 426–27.
128. Wendell, supra note 24. But see Martha T. McCluskey, How the Biological/So-
cial Divide Limits Disability and Equality, 33 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 112
(2010) (rejecting the need to divorce medical from social causes of disadvantage
and instead advocating for a system that asks “whose potentially disadvanta-
geous differences are systematically privileged as public concerns deserving pub-
lic support and whose are penalized as private problems”).
129. Wendell, supra note 24.
130. Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category
of Disability Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (1999) (ex-
plaining the medical model of disability “largely consigns individuals with disa-
bilities to a position of passivity and dependence”); see also Michael Ashley Stein,
Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2007) (arguing that the disability
human rights paradigm is the more inclusive approach, where society acknowl-
edges value by inherent human worth instead of contribution).
131. Wendell, supra note 24 (citing disabled persons’ narratives that persons with cer-
ebral palsy or quadriplegia are not properly identified as sick, and while needing
medical treatment like anyone else, are not seeking a medical cure or of being
actively ill).  Similarly, some groups or individuals who are seen or perceived as
having a disability may reject this identity, preferring to view their condition as a
culture rather than a disability.  One example is some deaf people who view hear-
ing implants as destroying a deaf culture.  Tucker, supra note 14, at 385.
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not be cured.132  It wrongfully viewed the disabled as charity figures
in need of social welfare to cure their disabilities.133 And when the
medical cure failed to fully integrate the disabled, society would some-
times turn to problematic solutions like institutionalization of the
disabled.134
In contrast, a social model of disability focuses on a social and po-
litical system that does not adequately consider or address disabled
persons’ needs.135  Disabled people are seen as no less capable than
others.136  Instead, disabilities “are socially constructed phenomena
brought about by attitudes toward people with disabilities which, once
embedded in social practices and institutions, sustain the disadvanta-
geous social condition of people with disabilities.”137  Under a social
model, instead of modifying the disabled body, the world is adjusted to
consider a variety of different bodies, for example by altering the build
environment to allow disabled people to access public spaces.138  As
Professor Shakespeare observes, impairment is different from disabil-
132. Berg, supra note 130, at 7 (explaining the medical model may serve “as unwanted
reminders of the vulnerability of the body that all humans inhabit, and of the
limited curative capacity of modern medicine.”); see also Leonard, supra note 12,
at 3 (“A public policy that views individuals with disabilities as permanently
‘sick,’ however well intentioned, runs the risk of dispiriting and dehumanizing its
would-be beneficiaries.”).
133. Tucker, supra note 14, at 343–44 (“People with disabilities do not seek handouts
or charity from others, nor do they seek to be awarded special favors or entitle-
ments (indeed, the term ‘disabled’ is used in the ADA rather than the previously
used term ‘handicapped,’ because the term ‘handicapped’ was viewed as describ-
ing one who held his cap in hand, asking for charitable assistance.  To the con-
trary, people with disabilities seek only to be treated in the same manner as
people without disabilities are treated.  They seek to be placed on equal footing
with people without disabilities.”).
134. Wendell, supra note 24. See also Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Dis-
abled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966) (discussing early writ-
ings on the need for a movement from institutionalization to integration for the
disabled).
135. Professor Michael Oliver is a predominant scholar in the social disability move-
ment beginning with his book, Social Work with Disabled People (1983).  He cred-
its the UK movement, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
(UPIAS), with beginning the social disability movement in the 1970s.  Mike Oli-
ver, The Social Model of Disability: Thirty Years On, 28 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 1024
(2013).
136. Id.
137. JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 13 (1993).
138. A third model, the minority group model of disability, builds on the social model
and emphasizes that “people with disabilities are a minority group who histori-
cally have had, and continue to have, their civil rights violated both by prejudice
and by entrenched patterns of exclusionary and segregating behavior on the part
of the nondisabled majority.”  Crossley, supra note 12, at 878.  This is akin to
other forms of discrimination like race and gender.  Some who embody this group
focus on the technique of “historical counterfactualizing” to ask “how our social
landscape would look different if people with disabilities constituted a dominant
group in society.” Id. at 879 (discussing Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to
1096 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1071
ity.139  Impairment is the private and individual experience while dis-
ability is public and structural.140  This model seeks to accept
impairment and remove disability.141
This debate somewhat contributes to why health insurance has not
been at the forefront of some disability advocates’ agendas.142  Yet,
many scholars note that a social model of disability does not require
us to reject or ignore the medical needs of the disabled.  Even those
who advocate for social models of disability recognize health benefits
as of central importance to the disabled in order to be healthy enough
to engage in society, the primary goal of disability antidiscrimination
law.  Indeed, some scholars have viewed social participation as the
very reason why we as a society ought to provide health care to all of
our citizens, disabled or not.143  In accordance with this idea that
health care is good for all, the ACA focuses on health care discrimina-
tion being a population problem that affects many groups besides the
disabled: the elderly, women, the chronically ill, and others.  In em-
phasizing that discrimination in health insurance is a wider health
care finance issue, and not just an issue for the disabled alone, many
of the concerns about the charity element of medical models of disabil-
ity are also removed.
Accepting that civil rights remedies are critical for pursuing equal-
ity in health care for the disabled and that discrimination against the
disabled by health insurers persists, these cases face their most signif-
icant barrier in the form of the harmful precedent of Alexander v.
Difference: Caring (F)or Justice for People with Disabilities, HYPATIA, Winter
1995, at 48–52).
139. Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES
READER 195 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 5th ed. 2017).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Wendell, supra note 24, at 18 (observing that in focusing on the medical needs of
some disabled, this may foster thinking about the disabled as incapacitated and
in need of cure, rather than being in need of social support.  It also harkens back
to not so long ago efforts to institutionalize the disabled rather than enable them
to lead independent lives, which has motivated activists to “distinguish them-
selves from those who are ill.”).
143. Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 2 (2001);
see also Wendell, supra note 24 (“[S]ome unhealthy disabled people, as well as
some healthy people with disabilities, experience physical or psychological bur-
dens that no amount of social justice can eliminate . . . .  [S]ome very much want
to have their bodies cured” in addition to curing ableism as a concept.).  Also see
Oliver, supra note 135, in which the scholar credited with developing the social
model clarifies that the social disability movement should not be and was never
intended to be entirely exclusive of individual or medical remedies, but rather to
broaden what was seen as disability from individual harm to group injury in the
form of systematic barriers as a way to increase actions and social movement.
See also Shakespeare, supra note 139 (nothing that one weakness of the social
model is that it “so strongly disowns individual and medical approaches, that it
risks implying that impairment is not a problem”).
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Choate.144  This case has come to stand for a clear and troubling doc-
trine in disability antidiscrimination law “that an accommodation can
be required only if it provides people with disabilities ‘access’ to the
same benefit received by nondisabled individuals; an accommodation
that would alter the ‘content’ of the benefit will not be required, even if
it can be provided at reasonable cost and without undue hardship.”145
III. THE ACCESS/CONTENT DISTINCTION
AND HEALTH INSURANCE
Cases that challenge discriminatory benefit design meet a barrier
in the form of Alexander v Choate, which for thirty years has stood for
the notion that discriminatory insurance benefits are outside of the
reach of disability antidiscrimination law.146  This is particularly
problematic now that most forms of discrimination post-ACA are in
benefit design.  The next section will describe Choate and its implica-
tions for insurance benefits, before turning to strategies to move past
its limiting effect in health care.
A. Alexander v. Choate
Alexander v. Choate begins when plaintiffs, a class of disabled Ten-
nessee residents, sued their state Medicaid agency.147  Faced with an
all-too-common Medicaid deficit, the state decided to implement cost-
cutting procedures by reducing the number of covered inpatient hospi-
tal days from twenty to fourteen.148  The plaintiffs argued that the
cuts violated the Rehab Act by disproportionately harming the dis-
abled who were more likely to need the twenty covered hospital days
than their nondisabled counterparts.149  They argued not only that
the specific cut in question was discriminatory because it had a dispro-
portionate effect on the disabled, but also that any annual limit on
covered days was likely impermissible as having a disproportionate
effect on the disabled.150  The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to pre-
vent the cuts from moving forward and suggested that the state in-
stead limit inpatient hospital days based on the condition being
treated.151
144. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
145. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 71.
146. See id.
147. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289.
148. Id.
149. According to the uncontested record, over 27% of disabled persons needed more
than fourteen hospital days compared with less than 8% of nondisabled. Id. at
290.
150. Id.
151. For example, if an appendectomy is expected to only require three hospital days,
then the state agency could set such a limit.  Of course, this cap could also be
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A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit agreed that there was a prima
facie case in support of a violation of the Rehab Act.152  The state was
asked on remand to demonstrate whether there were other ways to
achieve similar cost-cutting benefits without disproportionately harm-
ing the disabled, or alternatively, to offer substantial justification for
the need to make such cuts.153  Essentially, this court raised the stan-
dard of “undue burden” that is frequently seen in Rehab Act and ADA
cases—i.e., that a reasonable accommodation is not required if it can-
not be reasonably achieved.
In a partial victory, a unanimous Court under Justice Marshall ac-
knowledged that claims alleging disparate impact could move forward
under the Rehab Act, and intentional discrimination was not
needed.154  The Court viewed this as necessary to address disability
discrimination, which is so often the result of “benign neglect” rather
than intentional mistreatment.155  Architects do not build buildings
with an aim toward excluding the disabled, but still they are harmed
all the same if they cannot go inside.156
Acknowledging that disparate impact must be permitted under the
Rehab Act, the Court was then left in a quandary.  How could it re-
spect the need for some amount of disparate impact but limit such
suits, given that disabled may often be disparately affected by insur-
ance decisions because they are not similarly situated to their nondis-
abled peers?157  Health care for the disabled can be costly, and, as the
plaintiffs noted, any annual cap on hospitals days could be argued to
disparately affect the disabled.  Could any cuts escape a claim of un-
lawful discrimination given that cuts must sometimes occur in a state-
and federally-funded health care program?
Ultimately, the Court reached for a compromise in the “meaningful
access” standard, which was meant to respect the need for some dispa-
rate impact claims while keeping “§504 within manageable
bounds.”158 The Marshall Court rejected the undue burden considera-
tions raised by the Sixth Circuit. Instead, they adopted the “meaning-
ful access” standard which requires entities to ensure “meaningful
access” to the programs that their nondisabled counterparts can ac-
cess, but they need only make a “reasonable” accommodation to suit
subject to contest, unless it specifically made accommodation for complex cases
where more covered days may be medically necessary. Id. at 291.
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id. at 291–92.
154. Id. at 292–99.
155. Id. at 295.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 299.
158. Id.
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the disabled.159  They need not go so far as to make a fundamental
change to the program or a substantial modification.160
Applying this standard to the Choate plaintiff’s argument that the
fourteen-day limit was discriminatory, the Court disagreed, holding
that plaintiffs had been granted “meaningful access.”161  The cut was
neutral, in that it did not take any protected trait into account, for
example, by excluding some groups from the benefit while giving it to
others.162  The disabled received the same access to the same benefit
as their nondisabled counterparts, no more but no less.163
To the argument that the disabled needed more covered inpatient
days, the Court essentially saw the question as beyond the bounds of
the Rehab Act.164  The Medicaid agency need not single out the dis-
abled for greater coverage because Medicaid does not guarantee “ade-
quate health care” for its recipients or require plans to be tailored
specifically to the needs of particular recipients, even the disabled.165
The Court, in essence, was unwilling to examine the content of the
benefit for whether it was adequate or whether it could be altered,
reasonably, to better integrate the disabled.  Instead, they saw the
benefit as fourteen days, or whatever else the state chose to offer.166
The question was not what that benefit was or whether it was ade-
quate, or indeed whether it could be changed in an affordable manner
to accommodate the disabled, but instead whether the disabled had
access to it like others who were not disabled.
The argument that any cut to covered inpatient days would dispa-
rately impact the disabled was likewise rejected for similar reason-
ing.167  This was seen by the Court as essentially another request for
accommodation that need not be granted.168
159. Id. at 301.
160. Id.  This standard was adopted from a prior Rehab Act case, Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).  In that case, a deaf nursing stu-
dent sought accommodation to attend a registered nursing program by asking for
a classroom attendant and removal of the obligation to attend clinical classes.
The Court rejected her accommodation request as fundamental alteration of the
program, in part, because the accommodation was “far more than the “modifica-
tion” the regulation require[d].” Id. at 410.  The Davis Court believed that such
accommodation would fundamentally alter the nursing program, that Davis
couldn’t practice as a registered nurse, and that Davis wouldn’t benefit from the
accommodation. Id. at 407–14.
161. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302–06.
162. Id. at 302.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 303.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 306–09.
168. Id.
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The Court concluded that while the Rehab Act must reach some
claims of disparate impact, the cuts under Tennessee Medicaid were
not among them.169  Notably, the Court failed to define what mean-
ingful access was or what types of claims might fall within it.170
B. The Access/Content Distinction Post-Choate
Courts since Choate have applied the meaningful access standard
according to the access/content distinction.171  If a plaintiff can show
that the issue is in the ability to access the benefit itself, she will suc-
ceed.172  However, if the plaintiff already has access to the benefit and
the challenge has to do with whether the benefit itself is adequate, for
example the disabled person requires more or different benefits, then
the claim will fail.173  The plaintiff is seen as receiving meaningful
access if she receives at least the same benefits as everyone else, but
no more or no different benefits.174  That the case alters benefits is
used as an affirmative defense which succeeds even if the requested
change would be easily and affordably achieved.
While this doctrine extends beyond health insurance,175 nowhere
has Choate “drained the statute of effectiveness” so much as in the
case of health insurance, where the content can so effectively discrimi-
169. Id. at 309.
170. Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Debilitating Alexander v. Choate:
“Meaningful Access” to Healthcare for People with Disabilities, 35 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 447, 452–53 (2008).
171. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 73.
172. Id. at 71.
173. Id.
174. One significant exception appears to be Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999)
where the Court avoided the access/content distinction by viewing the case as
more about administration of benefits than more or different benefits.  Plaintiffs
were disabled persons in need of long-term care.  While their physicians said that
institutional care was inappropriate for them, community-based care was not
funded enough by the state for there to be openings for them.  They sued, alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA.  They won, because the
Court distinguished their claim from Choate.  The Court did not see this as a
matter of benefits, i.e., that the plaintiffs wanted more or better access than
nondisabled counterparts, because the state had already agreed to provide the
benefit (community-based care).  Instead, they were able to frame the problem as
one of access because the problem was that they were not administering that
benefit in a way that protected these disabled persons. This is largely a matter of
framing, but again, courts may be reluctant to broadly frame matters as ones of
administration instead of benefit design and we certainly have not seen a turning
away of the access/content distinction since Olmstead.  For more on Olmstead as
compared to Choate, see Rosenbaum, supra note 8.
175. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 39 (arguing that in Doe v. Omaha, “Judge Posner
made clear that the access/content distinction was not an insurance-specific doc-
trine.  Rather, it reflected a general limitation on the ADA’s accommodation
requirement.”).
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nate.176  A long line of cases have refused to consider discrimination in
health insurance benefits because of the access/content distinction in
health insurance cases,177 and health insurance seems to be the most
frequent context in which plaintiffs lose because of this distinction.178
Though Choate was a case dealing with public benefits and the
Rehab Act, the access/content distinction has been extended into pri-
vate insurance and to ADA cases.  In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, plain-
tiffs contested two private insurance plans that placed lifetime limits
on benefits for AIDS treatment.179  The policies limited lifetime bene-
fits for AIDS and related therapy to $25,000 and $100,000 respec-
tively.180  Plaintiffs challenged the private insurance caps under Title
III of the ADA, the public accommodation statute.181
In a memorable decision by Judge Posner, the AIDS caps were up-
held as permissible under the ADA.  Similar to Choate, the plans of-
fered the same benefits to the disabled as they offered to the
nondisabled because all parties were subject to the AIDS cap regard-
176. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 37.
177. For example, see Bagenstos, supra note 1, 41 nn.168–69, for a list of cases where
courts refused to consider content-level discrimination either on the basis of the
treatment or of the diagnosis.  For a case supporting the holding in Doe that ADA
regulates access to plans but not content, see Micek v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-
6757, 1999 WL 966970, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1999) (“[P]laintiffs in this case do
not assert that the City denies policy access or coverage to disabled persons . . . .
Plaintiffs complain [instead that they cannot] receive the treatment and equip-
ment they desire . . . .  Accordingly . . . their complaint would fail to state a
claim.”).
178. See also Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1845 (2005) (“Similarly, my review of the
Title II case law reveals a growing body of Medicaid and health care litigation
where courts, applying Alexander, decline to change the content of what states
offer under Medicaid or other health services programs.  This reinforces Bagen-
stos’s idea that in these types of cases, courts have applied the access/content dis-
tinction at a high level of generality.”).  In a database he maintained of ADA
cases, he found that 82% of Title III cases against insurers had favorable results
for the defendant.  He points to several cases suggesting that the courts are mov-
ing somewhat away from the access/content distinction in Medicaid cases,
though, including pointing to Olmstead and Lovell v. Chandler.  Overall, he found
the access/content distinction to be most problematic in health insurance, and
much less so in other settings:
To be sure, after reviewing the Title III case law, I am convinced that
certain categories of cases (primarily insurance cases) basically are no
longer useful Title III issue areas, in part because of the concerns that
Bagenstos articulates.  But there is also a large universe of Title III
cases—those involving architectural barriers—that are not as affected
by the access/content distinction.
Watersone, supra, at 1847.
179. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558 (7th Cir. 1999).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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less of whether they had AIDS or HIV.182  To Posner, the plaintiffs
sought to change the benefit, not merely to access it:
Mutual of Omaha does not refuse to sell insurance policies to such persons—it
was happy to sell health insurance policies to the two plaintiffs.  But because
of the AIDS caps, the policies have less value to persons with AIDS . . . people
with AIDS have medical needs unrelated to AIDS, and the policies give such
people as much coverage for those needs as the policies give people who don’t
have AIDS.  If all the medical needs of people with AIDS were AIDS-related
and thus excluded by the policies, this might support an inference that Mu-
tual of Omaha was trying to exclude such people, and such exclusion . . . might
violate the Act.183
By seeking to remove the AIDS cap, plaintiffs went beyond asking for
access to altering the content of the benefits:
The common sense of the statute is that the content of the goods or services
offered by a place of public accommodation is not regulated. A camera store
may not refuse to sell cameras to a disabled person, but it is not required to
stock cameras specially designed for such persons.184
Accommodation is required to enable access to a benefit, and then only
to the extent the accommodation is reasonable.185  “But no accommo-
dation will be required—no matter how reasonable—if it would alter
the content of the opportunity the defendant offers generally.”186  No-
tably, the loss of the plaintiffs was entirely because of the access/con-
tent distinction, and not any question of whether the ADA applied to
the insurers.187
C. Critiques of the Access/Content Distinction
The access/content distinction has been critiqued on a number of
grounds related to health insurance.  By only looking to whether the
disabled have the same benefits as everyone else and not to what the
content of those benefits is, the courts truly look past the issue of dis-
parate impact, despite the Choate court recognizing disparate impact
as permissible.188  By failing to truly recognize disparate impact, the
182. Id. at 559.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 560.
185. Id.
186. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 69.
187. Bagenstos, supra note 1, 41 n.170 (highlighting access/content distinction as the
primary barrier to change in health insurance and summarizing case law, noting
that “[s]ome courts and judges, to be sure, have relied primarily on the safe har-
bor provision in such cases, but they are a distinct minority”).  For a discussion of
the safe harbor provisions that insulate insurance underwriting in ADA cases,
see supra note 125.
188. Crossley, supra note 1, at 81 (“[C]ourts fail to recognize the application of dispa-
rate impact theory to insurance practices.”); Abbe, supra note 11, at 1202
(“Choate’s basic holding, that a blanket cap on health care is not a deprivation of
meaningful access, has been repeatedly upheld by courts, but this holding over-
looks the fact that treating the disabled and nondisabled exactly alike will not
2017] RESTORING CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE DISABLED 1103
access/content distinction assimilates accommodation claims as close
to traditional antidiscrimination as possible.189  By forcing plaintiffs
to only bring suit where they have been denied outright access, those
claims look more akin to facial and intentional forms of discrimination
where the remedy is to seek inclusion only.190  Ultimately, Professor
Bagenstos sees this failure to respect accommodation as a conse-
quence of a general forgiveness for rational discrimination.191  That is,
we as society feel we ought to penalize intentional discrimination, but
we feel that we ought not to penalize entities where they are simply
acting according to their own economic interests and not out of a sense
of bias or hatred.192  This same concept was present in the ADA when
it forgave rational economic, actuarially based discrimination with the
safe harbor that permits insurers to underwrite.193  Professor Bagen-
stos rejects this distinction, however, because even rational discrimi-
nation can lead to subordination of groups, which is ultimately what
we are seeking to avoid in civil rights law.194
Professor Crossley argues that the access/content distinction in
health insurance fails to recognize how health insurance is a distinct
product from other products.195  She argues that health insurance and
health care are distinguishable from other goods and services because
the health insurance market is uniquely discriminatory against the
disabled.196  It segments the market according to risk of consuming
health care and thus seeks to avoid the disabled, as opposed to other
businesses which would find the disabled as simply another market to
sell products to.197  Likewise, while perhaps a camera store need not
sell special cameras, reasonable accommodation seems more neces-
sary in the case of health insurance, which is of both medical and so-
cial importance for the disabled and nondisabled alike.198
Professor Orentlicher has critiqued the access/content standard for
turning the concept of equitable health care allocation upside down.199
result in the same benefits for the two groups; otherwise, there would be no need
for a Rehabilitation Act or an ADA.”).
189. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9, at 69.
190. Id.
191. Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Polit-
ics of (Disability) Civil Rights Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 848–49 (2003).
192. Id. at 851.
193. See supra note 125.
194. Id. at 851–52.
195. Crossley, supra note 1, at 83–84.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. As Crossley wryly notes, while the number of people without cameras might
match the number of uninsured, “I have heard no politician spinning forth elabo-
rate and expensive proposals to increase camera ownership by Americans.” Id. at
84.
199. Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 80.
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Let alone failing to enable reasonable accommodation, it creates and
perpetuates an unfair system.200  It “permits unequal treatment as
long as everyone receives a decent minimum level of the benefit.”201
The access/content distinction also contributes to a harmful frag-
mentation in civil rights, a theory introduced by Professor Satz.202
According to her theory of fragmentation, civil rights laws only apply
to certain people at certain times, irrespective of whether an individ-
ual needs protection outside of those narrowly defined legal catego-
ries.203  “[A]n individual may be able to enter a workspace, board a
public bus, or enter a shopping mall, but that does not mean that she
will be able to work, travel to a desired destination, or shop.”204  Like-
wise, the civil rights claim in health insurance can only get a plaintiff
so far.  It can help them to purchase a plan but not to ensure that the
plan actually has any value for them as a disabled person.
Perhaps most significant, the access/content distinction limits dia-
logue in the courts around several important legal and policy issues.
By avoiding reasonable accommodation, the benefit/access distinction
stunts a conversation about what it would require to create equal ben-
efits for the disabled.  It also completely ignores whether any addi-
tional benefits not covered in the four corners of a given plan might be
necessary for disabled populations.  And it removes the opportunity to
explore whether or not an accommodation would even be feasible.205
As Professor Bagenstos notes, “[t]hese doctrines categorically exclude
certain classes of accommodation from the purview of [disability
law]—even if the requested accommodations could be provided rea-
sonably and without undue hardship.”206  It fails to explore to what
extent an insurer, even a rational for-profit insurer, might be able to
accommodate certain special needs of the disabled, whether in the
form of less cost-sharing, greater access, or additional benefits.207 As
Professor Rosenbaum explains it, even if the change is not costly and
even if the practice is discriminatory, such changes to benefits are
seen as so “administratively burdensome that they exceed what the
ADA requires the public entity to reasonably do. In effect, the issue
becomes a matter for the political, rather than the judicial,
process.”208
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 EMORY
L.J.  277, 289 (2010).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 289.
205. Bagenstos, supra note 1.
206. Id. at 35.
207. Id.
208. Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, D. Richard Mauery, & Alexandra Stewart,
Reasonable Modification or Fundamental Alteration? Recent Developments in
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Overall, courts continue to view discriminatory benefit design as
outside the scope of disability antidiscrimination law because of the
access/content distinction.  The next section argues that administra-
tive agencies and Congress have moved past the access/content dis-
tinction and that the courts should follow and fully engage the
question of accommodation in health insurance.
IV. REINSTATING CIVIL RIGHTS FOR THE DISABLED
IN HEALTH INSURANCE
The access/content distinction coming out of Choate has rendered
disability-based discriminatory health benefits untouchable by civil
rights law for over thirty years.  But there is evidence that agencies
are willing to look beyond the access/content distinction in their re-
view of insurance plans and in agency complaints.  Courts should do
the same.  This section argues that section 1557 of the ACA allows
DHHS/OCR, the agencies tasked with reviewing insurance plans for
discrimination, to move beyond the access/content divide and to fully
consider benefit discrimination based on newly implemented rules.
Second, if agencies are to stray from this access/content distinction,
the Article argues that courts also should, and should use agency
guidelines as a starting point for a new legal standard to review bene-
fit discrimination.209
A. Section 1557, Agency, and the Access/Content Distinction
The final rules for section 1557 of the ACA, in effect, move past the
access/content distinction requiring DHHS/OCR and the courts to con-
sider claims of benefit discrimination under section 1557.  This section
describes how DHHS/OCR rejects the access/content distinction and
what standard they will apply in its place.
1. Section 1557
Congress enacted section 1557, a new health care-specific civil
right, as part of the ACA.210  Section 1557 uniquely extends four dis-
tinct civil rights laws, Title VI, Title IX, the Age Discrimination Act,
and the Rehab Act, to health care programs that are receiving federal
ADA Caselaw and Implications for Behavioral Health Policy, CTR. FOR HEALTH
SERVICES RES. AND POL’Y (Feb. 2003), http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1005&context=sphhs_policy_briefs.
209. There are good normative reasons to question Choate’s access/content distinction,
as well, as nodded to supra Part III.
210. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012). See Sid-
ney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Re-
form, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 859 (2012) (arguing that section 1557
is uniquely applied to health care).
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funding.211  Section 1557 is a broad-sweeping civil rights standard
created in response to increased federal expenditures in health care,
in health insurance, and other forums.212  The statute is broad-sweep-
ing and suggests an effort on the part of Congress to widely protect
civil rights in health care.  Likewise, the final rules published in May
2016213 by DHHS/OCR also suggest an intent to broadly prohibit dis-
crimination in health care.
Section 1557 applies to public insurance214 and private insurance
under its purview.215 In the realm of private insurance, federal subsi-
dies and tax credits designed to defray the cost of private insurance
are encompassed in the definition of federal financial assistance.216
Thus an insurer offering a plan on a state or federally facilitated ex-
change will come under section 1557’s reach if any of their enrollees
pay their premiums in part with a federal subsidy or tax credit.217
This addresses virtually all private insurers offering plans on the ex-
211. Section 1557 applies to “any health program or activity, any part of which is re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance . . ., or under any program or activity that is
administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under [Title I of
the Act or its amendments].”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42
U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2012).  Uniquely, section 1557 addresses discrimination in
health care against several different protected classes, whose protections stems
from different civil rights laws and doctrine.
212. As President Kennedy noted in forming civil rights laws like Title VI, “Simple
justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races [colors, and
national origins] contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, en-
trenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national origin] discrimination.”
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000D ET SEQ, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/TitleVI-Overview [https://perma.unl.edu/
DCG5-5A7K].
213. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 45 C.F.R. § 92 (2016).
214. 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016) (explaining a “health program or activity also includes all
of the operations of a State Medicaid program, a Children’s Health Insurance
Program, and the Basic Health Program,” but note that the definition of Federal
financial assistance does not include Medicare Part B).
215. Id. (“Federal financial assistance the Department provides or otherwise makes
available includes Federal financial assistance that the Department plays a role
in providing or administering, including all tax credits under Title I of the ACA,
as well as payments, subsidies, or other funds extended by the Department to
any entity providing health-related insurance coverage for payment to or on be-
half of an individual obtaining health-related insurance coverage from that entity
or extended by the Department directly to such individual for payment to any
entity providing health-related insurance coverage.”).
216. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,445 (May 18, 2016) (“Qualified health plan issuers
receiving Federal financial assistance through advance payments of premium tax
credits and cost-sharing reductions (which include at least the 169 health insur-
ance issuers in the Federally-facilitated Marketplaces receiving Federal financial
assistance through advance payments of premium tax credits and cost sharing
reductions and at least 11 issuers operating in the State-Based Marketplaces
that we were able to identify)”).
217. Id.
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change.  Those insurers’ nonexchange plans are also regulated, along
with any insurance plan that they function as a third party adminis-
trator for.218  This last part captures many large group plans, as in-
surers will often offer small and individual insurance, as well as
acting as third party administrator for large group plans.219
Additionally, section 1557 extends to Medicare and Medicaid and
to DHHS in its administration of health care programs.220  The law
also covers individual, small group, and large group insurers or ad-
ministrators who receive other federal funds, for example through fed-
eral grants.221  As evidence of DHHS/OCR’s efforts to make section
1557 have teeth, the regulations broaden private rights of action in
disparate impact to all four civil rights statutes under section 1557,
even though these same actions are not available for some of these
statutes outside of health care.222
218. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, Summary of Regula-
tory Changes, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,357, 31,429 (May 18, 2016). (“We provided an ex-
ample illustrating that an issuer participating in the Marketplace?SM, and
thereby receiving Federal financial assistance, that also offers plans outside the
Marketplace?SM would be covered by the regulation for all of its health plans, as
well as when it acts as a third party administrator for an employer-sponsored
group health plan.”).
219. For example, if a Blue Cross state plan offers itself on the exchange, then section
1557 will apply to all of its insurance products: small group and individual insur-
ance products it sells on and off the exchange and its function as third-party ad-
ministrator of employer sponsored plans.  There does appear to be a significant
loophole created here by the final rules of section 1557.  DHHS/OCR acknowl-
edges that when it comes to benefit design, it will frequently be an employer who
designs benefits rather than a third-party administrator.  Section 1557 does not
extend to employers unless they are a health care activity in their own right that
receives federal funds. When an employment insurance plan is viewed as being
discriminatory, DHHS/OCR will look to who created the plan.  If it was created
by the insurance entity as a third party, they can be accountable under section
1557.  If it’s the employer, then it can only be accountable if it is a covered health
care entity (like an insurer themselves, or some hospitals, or health care organi-
zations).  45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
220. See supra note 243.
221. “Federal financial assistance” includes grants, loans, and other types of assis-
tance. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.4 (2016).
222. The final rule for section 1557 was published on May 18, 2016, and it seeks to
create a unified standard for section 1557 and for all of its relevant protected
classes, for example, by permitting private causes of action for disparate impact
claims in all of the four protected classes.  This includes Title VI cases in which
private causes of action are not permitted outside of section 1557 such as in Alex-
ander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). See Nondiscrimination in Health Pro-
grams and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,439 (May 18, 2016) (quoting
Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D.
Minn. Mar. 16, 2015)) (“It appears that Congress intended to create a new,
health-specific, anti-discrimination cause of action that is subject to a singular
standard, regardless of a plaintiff’s protected class status.  Reading Section 1557
otherwise would lead to an illogical result, as different enforcement mechanisms
and standards would apply to a Section 1557 plaintiff depending on whether the
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Section 92.207 of section 1557’s regulations addresses discrimina-
tion in health insurance.223  Section 92.207 requires that “[a] covered
entity shall not, in providing or administering health-related insur-
ance or other health-related coverage, discriminate on the basis of
race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability.”224  In terms of ac-
cess to health insurance, insurers are prohibited from discriminating
on the basis of protected class in denying, cancelling, limiting, or re-
fusing to issue/renew a health insurance plan.225  Marketing practices
designed to discriminate are also prohibited.226
Section 92.207 also addresses content-side discrimination by insur-
ers.227  It explicitly forbids discriminatory “benefit designs” on the ba-
sis of disability, as well as age, race, and gender.228  Insurers may not
deny or limit claims or impose different cost-sharing (e.g., deductibles,
coinsurance, copays) on the basis of any of these protected classes.229
2. Section 1557’s Impact on the Access/Content Distinction
DHHS/OCR, as an agency, effectively overturns Choate in func-
tion, if not in name, in the section 1557 final rule.  DHHS/OCR makes
no mention of the “meaningful access” standard with respect to insur-
ance, though it does recognize (as required by the ADA) that entities
need not fundamentally alter their programs to accommodate.230  The
agency, though, explicitly rejects the access/content distinction by
specifying that benefit design can be discriminatory for all four of pro-
tected classes, including disability.
If benefit design can be viewed as discriminatory and there are im-
plementing regulations to suss out such discrimination, then it can no
longer be, at least according to DHHS/OCR, that benefit-level discrim-
ination is off the table for ADA/Rehab suits.  Whatever amounts to
fundamental alteration now, the agency recognizes that benefit design
plaintiff’s claim is based on her race, sex, age, or disability.  For example, it would
not make sense for a Section 1557 plaintiff claiming race discrimination to be
barred from bringing a claim using a disparate impact theory but then allow a
Section 1557 plaintiff alleging disability discrimination to do so.”).?
223. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. It adopts this standard in that it requires modifications to only be reasonable and
not rise to the level of a fundamental alteration to a program.  45 C.F.R. § 92.205
(2016) (“A covered entity shall make reasonable modifications to policies, prac-
tices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to avoid discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability, unless the covered entity can demonstrate that
making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the health
program or activity.”).
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can be considered and addressed through section 1557.231  Moreover,
DHHS/OCR refused to explicitly address whether or not “a modifica-
tion to add medically necessary care, or a prohibition on exclusions of
medically necessary services, is never a fundamental alteration to a
health plan” thus leaving the door open for suits that claim benefit
discrimination.
Either way, in recognizing that “[a] covered entity shall not, in pro-
viding or administering health-related insurance. . .[h]ave. . .benefit
designs that discriminate on the basis of. . .disability,”232 DHHS/OCR
has effectively rejected the access/content distinction as applied to dis-
ability antidiscrimination cases.  The access/content distinction is ren-
dered moot because DHHS/OCR acknowledges that benefit design is
part of the type of discrimination against disability that will be consid-
ered in section 1557.  Though DHHS/OCR did not explicitly acknowl-
edge its rejection of this standard, there can be no other conclusion, as
how else could one consider discrimination in benefit design if not by
reaching to and addressing the content of the insurance?
The recognition that benefit design can be discriminatory is mo-
mentous, and it should do much to further the interests of the disabled
in health care.  Even more though, DHHS/OCR in recognizing that
benefit design can be discriminatory under section 1557, also ad-
vances some guidance on how to assess what is or is not discrimina-
tory.  DHHS/OCR makes clear that insurers still have freedom to
define what is medically necessary233 and to leave off certain benefits
and services.234  Beyond this, in assessing benefit limits or denials of
service, the agency  will look to four factors: (1) whether coverage for
the same or a similar service or treatment is available to individuals
outside of that protected class; (2) whether it is available to those with
different health conditions; (3) the reasons for any differences in cov-
erage; and (4) whether there is a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason
for the denial or limitation that is not a pretext for discrimination.235
For example, they posit that if bariatric surgery were covered for adult
patients but not for adults with developmental delays, it would be con-
sidered discriminatory on the basis of disability.236  This example
looks like it does not reach beyond the access/content distinction—the
disabled party is only asking for access to the same benefit that others
231. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, General Comments, 81
Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,377 (May 18, 2016).
232. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
233. Id. (stating that section 1557 is not “intended to determine, or restrict a covered
entity from determining, whether a particular health service is medically neces-
sary or otherwise meets applicable coverage requirements in any individual
case.”).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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receive, not for an alteration of the benefits.  However, DHHS/OCR
has indicated that it will look beyond the question of just whether
other groups have access to the benefit to the other three factors.
These changes by the agency to consider benefits discrimination
through these four factors should apply to states and federal govern-
ment as they review insurers for listing on the exchanges, to the in-
surers themselves to ensure they are incompliance, and to DHHS/
OCR in reviewing complaints.
Given this momentous movement to recognize benefits discrimina-
tion, DHHS/OCR should consider introducing additional regulations
that delve into the context of discriminatory benefit design and pro-
vide examples for where a neutral, nondiscriminatory benefit design
exists and examples where an exclusion or a benefit limit is non-neu-
tral and discriminatory,237 particularly given that state regulators
who evaluate these insurance plans for compliance with the ACA ad-
mit to not being certain, to date, on what constitutes a discriminatory
benefit.238  In such a regulation, DHHS/OCR should also make a clear
and unequivocal statement that it rejects the access/benefit
distinction.
DHHS/OCR’s guidance on benefits for transgender patients pro-
vides an example of how the agency could consider benefit design dis-
crimination under the current rules.239  The rule requires that some
level of services be covered for gender reassignment, regardless of the
fact that this creates a benefit additional to and beyond that of people
not undergoing gender reassignment.240  The rule also forbids “cate-
gorical coverage exclusion[s] or limitation[s] for all health services re-
lated to gender transition,” and insurers must cover at least some
gender transition services, even if they are relatively affordable thera-
pies like hormone treatment, rather than expensive therapies like
237. The Family Equality Council has also called for clear standards to address “bene-
fit designs that are facially neutral but that have the effect of systematically dis-
advantaging members of protected class;” they propose a number of regulatory
efforts to help identify discrimination in benefit design including trained evalu-
ators to regularly review insurance contracts for protected class discrimination.
Comment Letter of the Family Equality Counsel on Proposed Rule on Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Bene-
fits, Actuarial Value, and Accreditation (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.familyequal-
ity.org/_asset/cst5jd/Family-Equality-Council-Comments-for-HHS-EHB-Pro
posed-Rule-12_20.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/CU46-QQBH]. See also Keith,
supra note 107 (suggesting how data mandated to be collected by the ACA can be
used to support a study of discriminatory benefit design; for example, section
4302 of the ACA mandates the gathering of information on health disparities of
the disabled).
238. Keith, supra note 107.  The researchers undertook an interview-based study of
insurance regulators in several states who described uncertainty in what consti-
tutes discriminatory benefit design.
239. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
240. Id.
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gender reassignment surgeries.241  The agency rationalizes their deci-
sion because such therapies were, in the past, frequently excluded
from insurance as experimental, and this is no longer supported by
current standards of care.242  While DHHS could have achieved the
same outcome by mandating gender reassignment as an aspect of
EHB, DHHS/OCR specifically chose to define this as a civil rights is-
sue.243  Particular services that have long been denied to the disabled
may be paralleled to the context of gender reassignment surgery.
Here, the agency did not just look to whether the denial involved ac-
cess to benefits or content; instead they looked to the reason behind
the long-standing failure to cover that benefit and found it discrimina-
tory in its purpose.  Under this same logic, the agency might consider
longstanding failure to cover certain durable equipment or habilita-
tive services (or to truly achieve parity with mental health services) as
equally wrongful and based on discriminatory reasons rather than
any neutral or nondiscriminatory reason.
DHHS/OCR’s embrace of design benefit as a form of discrimination
is an issue that the agency must hold to in its civil rights hearings.
But courts, too, can consider this as a good reason to steer away from
access/content distinctions in their section 1557 cases, given the
agency’s intent to recognize health benefit discrimination as within
the purview of section 1557.244
B. The Lost Precedential Value of Choate
While DHHS/OCR can be expected to handle complaints about dis-
crimination in benefits differently in reviewing of insurance for offer-
ing on the exchange and in agency complaints, courts also have good
reason to move away from access/content distinctions.  Beyond being
convinced by the efforts of the agency that implements these regula-
tions, there is still good reason for them to question the value of
Choate as precedence post-ACA.  As much of this Article has sug-
gested, benefits discrimination and much of health insurance has
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Section 1557 failed to specifically extend civil rights protections to discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, which is regrettable given the likely possibili-
ties of discrimination in that situation. See id.  For examples of possible discrimi-
nation against such groups in reproductive care, see N. Coast Women’s Care
Med. Grp. v. San Diego Cty. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145 (2008) (holding
state rights protected a lesbian couple from discrimination by an in-vitro fertili-
zation clinic who denied care on the basis of religious freedom).
244. Conceivably, litigants could challenge aspects of the DHHS/OCR as agency over-
reach and thus not a standard courts need to defer to out of concern for separa-
tion of powers concerns.  The author is not aware of any arguments that section
1557 overreaches and is not considering the question of judicial deference to the
agency in this Article.
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changed since that thirty-year-old opinion.  If nothing else, courts
should at least reevaluate Choate in the context of today’s modern
health care financing. Choate advances several policy arguments to
prop up its holding that have lost weight in the context of modern
health care financing.
1. Insurer Discretion
One theme advanced by the Choate court is that an accommodation
would go against the substantial discretion given to insurers (or the
states) in determining the “proper mix of amount, scope, and duration
limitations” of their Medicaid benefits.245  According to the Court,
Medicaid was under no obligation to provide adequate health care, in-
stead it was free to define its benefits and then it must only ensure
equal access to them:
Medicaid programs do not guarantee that each recipient will receive that level
of health care precisely tailored to his or her particular needs.  Instead, the
benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular package of health care ser-
vices, such as 14 days of inpatient coverage.  That package of services has the
general aim of assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care,
but the benefit provided remains the individual services offered-not ‘adequate
health care.’246
Professor Bagenstos has observed that the outcome of applying the
access/content distinction depends heavily on how broadly one defines
the benefit in question.247  Because Choate defined the benefit as the
fourteen covered days, it only needed to ensure equal access by the
disabled to those fourteen days.248  If the Court had, instead, defined
the benefit broadly as to include adequate health care, then Choate’s
plaintiffs could have prevailed because now they are being denied ac-
cess to the benefit since fourteen days does not amount to adequate
health care for them as a class.249  Courts typically did not view bene-
fits so generously, though.250
Similarly, professors Francis and Silvers have argued that the
“meaningful access” standard should be read as an equal opportunity
standard that requires benefits that have “equal serviceability for dis-
abled and nondisabled alike.”251  For example, a number of non-En-
glish speaking plaintiffs have successfully been able to argue denial of
meaningful access because, while admitted to educational programs,
245. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 (1985).
246. Id. at 303.
247. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 45.
248. Id. at 46–47.
249. Id. at 47–48.
250. See id.  See also Rosenbaum, supra note 8 (noting that civil rights cases challeng-
ing health care financing are highly dependent on the facts and it is not always
clear which way a court will turn).
251. Francis & Silvers, supra note 178, at 477.
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they were not able to meaningfully engage in programs without some
sort of covered interpretation services.252  The courts saw mere access
as not enough—instead, there must be equal opportunity to engage
with the benefit (here, understanding the lectures) in order to have
meaningful access.253  Neither of these views have gained major trac-
tion in the courts yet, so courts frequently allow defendants a wooden
application of access/content as an affirmative defense.
However, Medicaid itself has mandatory benefits, or benefits that
all states must cover in order to obtain federal match dollars to help
fund their programs.254  These mandated benefits are part of what
makes Medicaid so pragmatically useful for the disabled, because it
requires comprehensive coverage of certain types of services.  In craft-
ing the essential health benefits for private insurance, Congress also
recognized that there is a minimum, universal level of benefits that all
insurers must cover, at least in the private market and other markets
where EHBs apply (including some Medicaid plans).255  Other mea-
sures in the ACA target adequacy of benefits in these insurance mar-
kets.  The law caps out-of-pocket spending for essential health care256
and requires no cost-sharing for basic preventive services.257  The law
also regulates plans for their actuarial value, requiring plans to cover
a minimum percentage of the cost of services.258  All of these rules
reflect a certain value: that there is at least some minimum value that
health insurance must meet or it is no longer functioning as adequate
health care coverage for the disabled or for any other person.  This
reflects a significant departure from the understanding of in Choate
that insurers had free rein to define their benefit packages and that
their broad goal was not adequate health.259
One can view this according to Professor Bagenstos’s argument
about defining the benefit.260  With both EHB and mandatory benefits
252. Id. at 456–57.
253. Id.
254. See List of Medicaid and CHIP Benefits, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid
.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/Downloads/
List-of-Medicaid-and-CHIP-Benefits.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/C7C3-WQJD].
255. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022(2012) (ex-
tending EHB provisions to private insurers and to Medicaid expansion plans.)
Indeed, some insurance plans had to be taken off the market because they did not
offer robust enough coverage.  This was at the center of the much publicized con-
troversy when President Obama said you can keep your health plan if you like it.
Plans then had to be removed because they did not offer essential health benefits,
or did not do so at an appropriate actuarial value (shifting too much of the cost
onto the consumer).
256. Id. § 1302(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c).
257. Id. § 2713, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13.
258. Id. § 1302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d).
259. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
260. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 28.
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under Medicaid, we have a broader benefit: essential health benefits.
Access is not enough unless it reflects some level of essential or ade-
quate care for people.  Alternatively, we can view it as a shift in what
counts as meaningful access akin to the arguments advanced by Fran-
cis and Silvers.261  It is not enough in these programs to have access to
any old plan; it must offer meaningful benefits, akin to education
cases which critique the benefit for whether it actually allows the user
to meaningfully engage with it.262
Some might argue that essential health benefits and mandatory
benefits are not the same as adequate health care for the disabled.
However, the movement to regulate benefits for adequacy across both
public and private insurers is enough to question the access/content
distinction, which was overly ambivalent to quality of benefits.  More-
over, EHBs are supposed to not be designed to take into account only
average health care needs.263  As DHHS notes in its final rules, the
Secretary must not discriminate on the basis of disability and must
consider the particular health needs of the disabled in establishing the
EHBs.264  So adequate benefits now mean equal access to an essential
benefit package that is nondiscriminatory and broadly considers the
health needs of the disabled.
Moreover, by recognizing that insurance design can be discrimina-
tory according to a civil rights framework, DHHS/OCR has removed
some discretion from insurers.265  DHHS/OCR, not the insurers, now
can create some standard for what amounts to permissible discretion
in benefits, and what goes beyond that is unlawful discrimination.266
Thus benefit determinations are no longer unregulated; they are regu-
lated both by DHHS/OCR and by EHBs.267  Thus, deference to insur-
ers’ discretion to define their own benefits no longer seems
appropriate. Likewise, the same is true in Medicaid, where Congress
has set forth mandatory benefits. Insurers/states may have discretion
in their benefit design but only to a point where it is not discrimina-
tory or in conflict with law.
2. Administrative Burden
The Choate Court was worried, as a practical matter, that it would
be administratively burdensome to ask an insurer to evaluate their
benefits for whether they discriminate.268  According to the Court, be-
261. Francis & Silvers, supra note 178.
262. Id.
263. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
265. 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
266. Id.
267. See supra section III.A; 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
268. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 298.
2017] RESTORING CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE DISABLED 1115
cause the disabled are frequently not similarly situated to the
nondisabled:
[R]espondents’ position would in essence require each recipient of federal
funds first to evaluate the effect on the handicapped of every proposed action
that might touch the interests of the handicapped, and then to consider alter-
natives for achieving the same objectives with less severe disadvantage to the
handicapped.  The formalization and policing of this process could lead to a
wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative burden.269
This is a legitimate concern for private and public insurers alike,
particularly as administrative burden can contribute to rising health
care costs.270  However, the task of evaluating plans for disability-
based discrimination is no longer optional.  All plans being offered on
the exchange are reviewed by a state agency or federal agency for com-
pliance with ACA rules before being certified and placed on the ex-
change.271 Plans are reviewed for whether they offer an adequate
array of providers,272 for whether the plan covers the essential bene-
fits set forth by the state’s benchmark plan,273 for whether the plan is
discriminatory,274 for whether it offers benefits to a certain level of
cost-sharing,275 and for whether the plan engages in any sort of decep-
tive marketing practices,276 among other things.  Complaint processes
exist for consumers to challenge plans.277  Plans can be retroactively
decertified and can be expected to fall into regulatory compliance
before being recertified.278  Thus, an administrative system for re-
viewing plans is now in place, and one that is far more exhaustive
than what the Choate Court might ever have contemplated.
More to the point, plans are supposed to be examined for compli-
ance with EHB provisions and civil rights law which require that they
not discriminate against the disabled.279  Public insurers are increas-
ingly regulated, as well, and are sometimes accountable under the
269. Id.
270. Aliya Jiwani et al., Billing and Insurance-Related Administrative Costs in United
States’ Health Care: Synthesis of Micro-Costing Evidence, 14 BMC HEALTH SER-
VICES RES. 556 (2014).
271. “An Exchange shall, at a minimum— (A) implement procedures for the certifica-
tion, recertification, and decertification, consistent with guidelines developed by
the Secretary under subsection (c), of health plans as qualified health plans.”  Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(A) (2012).
272. Id. § 18031(c)(1).
273. Id. § 18031(d)(4)(A).
274. Plans should “meet marketing requirements, and not employ marketing practices
or benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in such plan
by individuals with significant health needs.” Id. § 18031(c)(1)(A).
275. Id. § 18031(d)(4)(A).
276. Id. § 18031(c)(1)(A).
277. States can receive grants from the federal government to have navigator who
handle and report patient grievances related to insurance denials.
278. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(4)(A).
279. See supra section III.A; 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
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ACA as well as other regulations.  A call for insurers to evaluate their
plans for disability discrimination is no longer burdensome.  Instead it
is legally required, if they want to avoid civil rights complaints or pos-
sible decertification from the exchange.
3. Adequate Health Benefits
While the Choate Court emphasized that plans were not required
to offer adequate health benefits, they were also concerned that such a
standard would be impossible to define.280  The Court was right to be
nervous at defining adequate health and to recognize it as an amor-
phous and challenging concept.  However, the perfect can be the en-
emy of the good.  The ACA has in fact attempted to define some
standard of adequate health, or at least adequate health benefits, with
the adoption of the EHB.281  The Secretary and the states work col-
laboratively to ensure that insurers cannot completely race to the bot-
tom with the meagerness of benefits they offer.  This is an ongoing
process to recognize what ought to be covered under EHB, how to
guarantee that EHBs are consistent and fair across all states, and
how to make sure that they reflect general commonplace health care
needs but also still take into account the needs of certain populations
like the disabled or children.282  Likewise, we have Medicaid’s
mandatory and optional benefits as examples.
While defining adequate health may be challenging, it is no longer
true that a court, in evaluating discrimination in a case like Choate,
would have no standards to look to.  Instead, they could look to the
EHB provisions.  For example, if EHB defines covered inpatient hospi-
tal days as an essential benefit, then there is some opportunity for the
courts to examine whether that essential benefit has been equally met
for the disabled as it has been for other parties.
4. Goals of the Rehab Act
The last argument invoked by the Court was whether a health in-
surance case was the right type of case to push the outer limits of
disparate impact under the Rehab Act.283  The Court argued that the
Rehab Act set forth a variety of substantive areas where it viewed
equality for the disabled to be particularly important, including “em-
ployment, education, and the elimination of physical barriers to ac-
cess.”284  Nothing in the Rehab Act specifically emphasized equality in
280. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303–04 (1985) (holding the “Act does not, how-
ever, guarantee the handicapped equal results from the provision of state Medi-
caid, even assuming some measure of equality of health could be constructed”).
281. See supra section III.A.
282. Id.
283. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 306–07.
284. Id.
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health benefits, and thus the Court was reluctant to extend disparate
impact too plainly there.285
Since Choate, there has been an increasing focus on discrimination
against the disabled in health care.  The ADA was constructed partly
with the purpose of combating “discrimination against individuals
with disabilities [in] . . . health services.”286 And while the Rehab Act
itself may not have placed health care among its priorities for equality
for the disabled, section 1557 has as a health-care-specific civil rights
law that specifically protects the disabled from health benefits dis-
crimination.287  Section 1557 claims are not Rehab Act claims, nor are
they ADA claims.288  Courts should view this distinction with some
deference.  Just as courts deferred to the failure of Congress to recog-
nize equality in health care as an important goal back then, they
should equally pay deference to Congress for creating section 1557
and the ACA and declaring equality in health care as a priority now.
V. RESTORING CIVIL RIGHTS TO THE DISABLED
IN HEALTH INSURANCE
Expansive civil rights will not solve all of the problems that the
disabled face when accessing health care.  Many scholars have offered
critiques of disability civil rights law generally in creating necessary
change for the disabled.289  Professor Roberts has convincingly argued
that civil rights has limits as a paradigm in supporting access to
health care for the disabled and that disability advocates can harness
both civil rights and health legislation to move forward with improv-
ing health care access for the disabled.290  This Article, too, recognizes
ongoing need for improved health care legislation.  For example, a
285. Id.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012); see also Crossley, supra note 1 (summarizing a long list
of congressional testimony in support of the adoption of the ADA that detailed
extensive barriers that disabled people face in obtaining health care).
287. Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 859 (2012) (“Congress intended to
create a new health-specific, antidiscrimination cause of action that is subject to
a singular standard, regardless of a plaintiff’s protected class.”).
288. Id.
289. Bagenstos, supra note 1 (arguing that civil rights laws have not addressed a host
of systemic barriers for the disabled, particularly in employment, and that disa-
bility activists are turning back to a welfare model to supplement their efforts to
redress systemic barriers to integration). See also Mark C. Weber, Disability and
the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889,
891 (advocating for more expansive and altered welfare programs to “advance
beyond the plateau that now has been reached” in disability rights.”). See also
Satz, supra note 202 (arguing that disability law is overly fragmented, treating
disabled people as only in need of protection in discretely defined legal limits).
290. Roberts, supra note 60. See also Pendo, Shifting the Conversation, supra note 32
(arguing that the ACA and civil rights laws can be complementary in achieving
change for the disabled in health care).
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more comprehensive essential health benefits provision that did not
permit significant state-level reduction in benefits could achieve some
of the same effects as civil rights suits and without the expense of
litigation.291  Ongoing market reforms and more stringent monitoring
of plans’ discrimination could also be regulatory fixes for many of the
problems presented in this paper.292  And universal health benefits
would be a significant step towards removing the need for significant
civil rights litigation for the disabled.293
Yet, in the midst of much reform in health care, and the possibility
of greater regulation in the future, there is still a space and a need for
civil rights.  Access to health insurance means little without access to
adequate benefits, and our civil rights need to catch up to this recogni-
tion.  If nothing else, it seems counter to all that the ACA stands for to
have civil rights doctrine that specifically exempts from regulation
any health insurers’ benefits discrimination against the disabled.294
A lingering concern remains from Choate, though.  Should we and
can we limit the scope of disparate impact in health insurance, given
that the disabled frequently are not on equal footing with their
nondisabled counterparts in their need for health care and claims for
accommodation could be boundless and costly?295  Some may argue
that insurers should be exempt from disability discrimination law, or
that it must be limited, mainly on the basis that permitting such suits
would destabilize the insurance market.296
One should look to the ACA and section 1557, though, to combat
such arguments.  First, many of the ACA’s more noteworthy provi-
sions are designed to tackle health status discrimination and to at-
tempt to equalize financial burden in the face of the very real truth
that Choate underscored—that some people may need more health
care than others.297  The ACA has been designed to stabilize the in-
surance market to adjust for a variety of reforms that create a more
inclusive insurance market, not just civil rights cases.298  Even more
though, the ACA sets a new tone, distinct from the era of Choate, that
underscores the importance of people with significant health needs be-
291. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 102.
292. Roberts, supra note 60.
293. Roberts, supra note 1 (advocating universal health benefits as a solution to ongo-
ing instances of discrimination in the insurance market post-health care reform).
294. See 45 C.F.R. § 92.207 (2016).
295. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298 (1985).
296. Crossley, supra note 12 (offering general arguments as to when and why reasona-
ble accommodation may be limited in health care).
297. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 287.
298. Mark A. Hall, The Three Types of Reinsurance Created by Federal Health Reform,
29 HEALTH AFF. 1168 (2010) (providing general background on how the ACA was
designed to stabilize the insurance industry in the face of limiting insurers’ risk
avoidance).
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ing able to access health insurance.  It shifts the cost of illness from
sick individuals onto society, embracing a more collective approach to
health care financing.299  This should make us rightly question the
use of civil rights as a shield to protect insurers’ disability
discrimination.
To truly realize the goals of civil rights laws for the disabled, the
courts and DHHS/OCR must be willing to consider reasonable accom-
modation in health benefits, as they would in other settings.  Reasona-
ble accommodation in health insurance, like any other situation,
would first require that the courts review benefits claims for discrimi-
nation and not outright dismiss them according to the access/content
distinction.  In reviewing this question, both courts and agencies may
look to the factors advanced by DHHS/OCR: (1) whether coverage for
the same or a similar service or treatment is available to individuals
outside of that protected class; (2) whether it is available to those with
different health conditions; (3) the reasons for any differences in cov-
erage; and (4) whether there is “a neutral, nondiscriminatory reason
for the denial or limitation that is not a pretext for discrimination.”300
Second, the courts and agencies can then consider other affirmative
defenses, such as whether it is truly a fundamental change to a pro-
gram and whether the change poses an undue hardship to the
entity.301
Undue hardship could be the check on boundless disparate impact
claims, instead of the arbitrary view of the access/content distinction
that benefit changes are always fundamental change not required by
ADA/Rehab Act.302  The insurer could no longer simply exclude the
disabled; it would now have to make the case for why the benefit is
prohibitively expensive.303  The Choate plaintiffs provide an example
of what this would look like in health insurance.304  They requested
299. Stone, supra note 1.
300. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375,
31,433 (May 18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. 92).
301. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012); Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
302. Id.; see BAGENSTOS, supra note 9.
303. Crossley makes a similar argument in contemplating a role for ADA suits in
managed care in the 1990s.  Disability law “does not compel health care decision-
makers to arrive at any particular substantive decision . . . ; [w]hat the law does
do . . . is compel decision-makers to take persons with disabilities into account in
their decisions . . . [making] people with disabilities . . . less likely to find them-
selves enrolled in a plan that is oblivious to or unaccommodating towards their
health care needs.”  Crossley, supra note 1, at 74.  Orentlicher has argued for
arecognition of reasonable accommodation in health care and has speculated
that, in rationing decisions, “a court would likely limit the obligation to accommo-
date when medical care provided minimal benefit and did so at a high financial
cost.”  Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 72.
304. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 291 (1985).
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that instead of an annual limit on inpatient days, hospital days be
limited based on condition.305  For example, if a reasonable time to
treat a lung infection were three days, then Medicaid could cap the
benefit there.306  Had the Court considered this accommodation, it
would ask whether it was reasonable and then whether the entity
could accommodate it without undue hardship.  The state Medicaid
agency would then have to examine their benefits plan to see whether
this different model of covering inpatient hospital days was actually
more prohibitively expensive than the current cap.  In other words,
does the cost of covering inpatient days based on medical need far sur-
pass the annual cap for everyone?  If it did, then the state Medicaid
agency would be free not to grant the accommodation.
Reasonable accommodation would not mean that the disabled have
all of their health care needs met.307  But it would allow for an impor-
tant shift in the dialogue.  In requiring reasonable accommodation,
the courts would not necessarily remove the ability of insurers to en-
gage in some rational economic conduct.308  Instead, it would force in-
surers to have to consider why their conduct is economically rational
and whether they can better meet the needs of the disabled.309  Ulti-
mately, there may be some additional expense stemming from reason-
able accommodation in health benefits.  However, Professor Bagenstos
argues this to be a fair outcome, as we should no more tolerate ra-
tional economic discrimination than animus-based discrimination.310
If our true goal is to reduce subordination of the disabled, it matters
not if someone subordinates you because they dislike you or because
it’s economically beneficial; the outcome is the same either way in that
you are still subordinated.311  And this is particularly true where we
cannot always deduce what is rational discrimination.312  Discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability is frequently presumed as economically
rational when it would not be viewed the same for race or sex.313
More, recognizing reasonable accommodation in health insurance
benefit design would force insurers to have to consider the disabled in
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 288.
308. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9.
309. Id.
310. Bagenstos, supra note 191.
311. Bagenstos bolsters his argument by raising the question of why.  If animus-based
discrimination were our only concern, would we narrow antidiscrimination law to
protected class?  If it were animus-based dislike we disapproved of, we would for-
bid it against all types of people.  But instead, we focus on protected groups be-
cause civil rights law ultimately seeks to attack subordination, not animus-based
hatred alone. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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their health insurance designs.314  There is nothing natural about our
health insurance system having been designed to better meet the
needs of the healthy than the sick.315  Instead, it is the result of a
system that favored the nondisabled in its policies, just as in other
settings.316  Rationing may be inevitable, but rationing on the basis of
sickness or disability is not.317  As Professor Stone importantly wrote,
our society made a political choice when it created a health care fi-
nancing system that put financial burdens on the individual, instead
of on the collective.318  Our health care financing system, like so much
of our infrastructure, was built without considering the needs of the
disabled, or with a mind toward avoiding their greater needs in favor
of a majority.319  Accommodating the disabled’s needs in health insur-
ance, though, would likely mean better health insurance benefits for
all, as is so often the case when the world is improved through reason-
able accommodation.320
A more generous vision of civil rights laws for the disabled would
allow section 1557 to have a single standard in how it handles discrim-
ination in health care, regardless of protected class.  Otherwise, only
the disabled will be limited in their ability to challenge health care
benefit discrimination.  Where protected classes have had different
standards under section 1557 (for example, in whether they could al-
low private causes of action for disparate impact), DHHS/OCR has
314. BAGENSTOS, supra note 9.
315. See Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 67 (arguing that “there is nothing ‘natural’ or
ineluctable about the fact that most aspects of socio-political organization re-
spond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities . . . .  Social norms
develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of
social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power”).
316. As Professor McCluskey explains:
In a social historical context in which unequal treatment of a particular
identity becomes systematically and pervasively entrenched in institu-
tions, culture, and policies, it is logical to expect that inequality on the
basis of such an identity would come to appear natural, rational, and
neutral . . . .  [I]f a person with paraplegia is excluded from a public bus
with steps . . . [j]udgments about whether that person is “really” differ-
ent from people who can climb up bus steps depend on what we consider
the substantive purpose of the bus: transportation for the public, or
transportation for members of the public who can climb steps? Deter-
mining whether the exclusion at issue is neutral . . .  or biased . . . de-
pends . . . on substantive moral and political decisions about whether
buses should normally and naturally be designed for entrance via steps
rather than by ramps or lifts.
McCluskey, supra note 128, at 114–16.
317. Indeed, many countries call their health insurance “sickness insurance” because
they recognize that their primary consumer ought to be the sick, and not the
healthy.  Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy
Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 652 (2008).
318. Stone, supra note 1.
319. Bagenstos, supra note 191; Orentlicher, supra note 34, at 67.
320. Satz, supra note 202.
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unified the standard and has chosen the more generous standard.  A
single standard that treats all equally (and lifts the bar where one
group is less protected) seems to be in line with how DHHS/OCR has
handled disparate impact and section 1557.321  Section 1557’s regula-
tions have broadened private actions in disparate impact for more
groups than was previously allowed,322 and have newly extended pro-
tections in health care to gender and sex discrimination.323  It also
seems in line with Congress’s intent, given that it collectively treated
the four protected classifications (race, sex, age, and disability) as on
equal footing with respect to health care when it crafted section 1557.
Disability antidiscrimination law has long permitted litigation on
health-specific discrimination and disparate impact,324 and address-
ing the access/content distinction in favor of the disabled reflects a
broader effort to fully make use of civil rights in combating health care
discrimination.
At the time of writing this, the future of health care in the United
Staes is uncertain.  The ACA, and perhaps section 1557 and its at-
tending regulations, face possible repeal or alteration in the face of
new presidential, congressional, and agency leadership.  Certainly
some of the specific arguments in this Article would need to be altered
were there to be significant sea change in how our health care system
is financed and regulated.  Nonetheless, this Article raises broader
themes and arguments, that stand apart from the ACA and section
1557, that should still lead agencies and the courts to question the
merits of the access/content distinction and to consider its resulting
harms.  First, despite the various iterations that our health care sys-
tem may face in the decades to come, Choate and the access/content
distinction is an over thirty-year-old precedent.  In some cases, this
leads courts to more strongly guard the precedent, but the holding and
the reasoning behind this case are heavily outdated, given how
broadly our health care system has changed in those years.  Second,
whether the ACA or another law stands in the near future, there does
seem to be a critical political and public shift in social policy that may
withstand any reforms—specifically, there appears to be increasing
agreement that health-based discrimination in health insurance is un-
acceptable.  Given that, the access/content distinction arbitrarily fore-
321. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.  Note that DHHS/OCR had the
choice, where there were incompatible standards,to simply let the different pro-
tected classes have different standards.  Instead, they sought to unify and ensure
that race was treated equally compared with the other groups.  The same could
be true here—the disabled should equally be permitted to challenge benefit de-
sign, just like other protected classes.
322. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
323. 45 C.F.R. § 92.206 (2016).
324. Recall that Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), also stands for permitting
disparate impact in disability suits, even though it later limited their scope.
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closes an evaluation of whether health insurers discriminate against
the disabled in health benefits.  This is a necessary matter to consider
if we seek a broader goal of considering equitable health care financ-
ing for those with serious health needs.  With these matters in mind,
agencies who seek to continue to regulate the health care industry and
courts hearing disability antidiscrimination suits should be critical of
the access/content divide, asking whether it furthers the goal of better
health and more equitable financing for the disabled and whether it is
a necessary and fair means of achieving what appears to be its
broader aims of controlling the rising cost of health care, given that
undue burden would remain an affirmative defense for insurers even
if the access/content distinction was eliminated.
Ultimately, a vision of health care financing in which the sick pay
their own way has eroded in recent years.  There is no reason why civil
rights law for the disabled cannot come along with this movement by
moving past the access/content distinction and fully considering dis-
crimination in health benefits for the disabled.
